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EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT, EFFECT ON 
CONSUMERS, AND THE FLAWED 
PROFIT-SACRIFICE STANDARD 
STEVEN C. SALOP* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust law sets standards for the competitive behavior of firms. 
There are two broad classes of anticompetitive conduct: collusion and 
exclusion. Collusion involves a group of firms cooperating with one 
another to restrict their own output. Exclusion involves a firm (or group 
of firms) raising the costs or reducing the revenues of competitors in 
order to induce the competitors to raise their prices, reduce output, or 
exit from the market. Utilizing either collusive or exclusionary practices, 
the firm (or group of firms) can achieve or maintain market power. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on exclusionary conduct, i.e., 
conduct that creates or maintains monopoly power by disadvantaging 
and harming competitors.! 
Exclusionary conduct decisions by antitrust enforcers and the courts 
sometimes have been criticized for protecting inefficient competitors 
* Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to 
thank Todd Anderson, jonathan Baker, Richard Brunell, Timothy Brennan, Margaret 
Bloom, Stephen Calkins, Dennis Carlton, Aaron Edlin, Einer Elhauge, joseph Farrell, 
john Fingleton, Warren Grimes, George Hay, Ken Heyer, Herbert Hovenkamp,jonathan 
jacobson, Thomas Krattenmaker, David McGowan, Alan Meese, john Nannes, Rainer 
Nitsche,janusz Ordover, Mark Popofsky, Carl Shapiro,joe Sims,john Vickers, Greg Vistnes, 
Gregory Werden, Robert Willig,john Woodbury, and the Editors for comments and helpful 
conversations on these issues. lowe special thanks to Andrew Gavil and A Douglas 
Melamed, who have both motivated and educated me about the complexity of these issues, 
and to Serge Moresi for helping me understand the more subtle economic issues. An 
earlier version of this article was presented at the AALS meeting in San Francisco, in 
january 2005. 
1 Section 1 of the Sherman Act is implicated when a group of competitors engages in 
collective exclusion, as in the case of exclusionary group boycotts, such as Tuys 'R' Us or 
pC Petroleum. Toys 'R' Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000); jTC Petroleum Co. v. 
Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999). In addition, Section 2 is implicated 
when a single firm attempts to orchestrate a cartel, as in American Airlines. United States 
v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984). Section 2 is also implicated for mergers 
to monopoly and conspiracies to monopolize. 
311 
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at the expense of consumers.2 Competitors may be disadvantaged and 
harmed by exclusionary conduct that raises their costs or cuts off their 
access to customers or suppliers. However, sometimes conduct that harms 
competitors benefits consumers, implying that such conduct should be 
applauded as competition on the merits, not attacked. Antitrust law is 
said to be a "consumer welfare prescription."3 The potential tension 
between harm to competitors and harm to consumers has created long-
standing controversy regarding the proper legal standards to govern 
exclusionary conduct.4 Even where harmful conduct is identified, critics 
suggest that enforcement will end up deterring other conduct that is 
beneficial to consumers.5 
There is currently great intellectual ferment over the proper antitrust 
liability standard governing allegedly exclusionary conduct under Sec-
tion 2 in the United States and Article 82 in Europe. This article focuses 
on the two main competing liability standards: the profit-sacrifice standard 
(and the no economic sense variant of the test) and the consumer welfare 
effect standard. The profit-sacrifice standard was introduced into antitrust 
not as a complete test for exclusionary conduct, but as a test of anticom-
petitive intent or as part of a multi-pronged standard.6 It recently has 
been suggested that the profit-sacrifice test alternatively could be made 
the only permissible evidence of anticompetitive purpose or even could 
be declared the sole liability standard.7 For example, the government's 
amicus brief at the petition stage in Trinko seemed to take this position 
as a way to reduce false positives.s Judge Ginsburg's Covad opinion also 
2 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 64-66 (1978). 
3 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,432 (2d Cir. 1945). 
5 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. I, 31 (1999); Frank Easterbrook, Predatory . 
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 266 (1981) [hereinafter Predatory 
Strategies] . 
6 Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and 
Product Innovation, 91 YALE LJ. 8 (1981) [hereinafter Predation]. 
7 The profit-sacrifice test is often characterized as a "predation" test for non-price 
predatory conduct For example, in Covad, Judge Ginsburg stated that, "in the vernacular 
of antitrust law, a 'predatory' practice is one in which a firm sacrifices short-term profits 
in order to drive out of the market or otherwise discipline a competitor." Covad Communi-
cations Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Although the focus of 
the analysis in this article is exclusionary conduct other than predatory pricing, the Brooke 
Group standard, set out by the Supreme Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & WiUiamson 
Tobacco Cup., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), is relevant to the analysis because of its conceptual 
relationship to the profit-sacrifice test. However, this article is not focused on evaluating 
the usefulness of the Brooke Group standard for predatory pricing cases. 
B See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
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seems to take this position.9 Gregory Werden 10 and A. Douglas Melamedll 
have suggested a variation on this standard that Werden refers to as the 
"no economic sense" standard. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit's Microsoft 
opinion,12 the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise,13 and my own workl4 suggest 
that consumer welfare effect would be a better overarching standard. 
Mark Popofskyl5 has suggested that there should not be a single standard, 
but instead the standard should differ according to the category of 
conduct alleged. 16 
The central thesis of this article is that the use of the profit-sacrifice 
test as the sole liability standard for exclusionary conduct, or as a required 
prong of a multi-pronged liability standard is fundamentally flawed. The 
profit-sacrifice test may be useful, for example, as one type of evidence 
of anticompetitive purpose. In unilateral refusal to deal cases, it can be 
useful in determining the non-exclusionary benchmark. However, the 
test is not generally a reliable indicator of the impact of allegedly exclu-
sionary conduct on consumer welfare-the primary focus of the antitrust 
laws. The profit-sacrifice test also is prone to several significant pitfalls 
and often would be complex and subjective to implement in practice. 
As a result, relying on the profit-sacrifice test as the legal standard would 
lead to significant legal errors. 
Instead, a better standard to govern exclusionary conduct is the con-
sumer welfare effect test, which is focused directly on the anticompetitive 
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]; 
see also R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of 
Justice, The Common Law Approach and Improving Standards for Analyzing Single Firm 
Conduct, Address at the Thirtieth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and 
Policy (Oct. 23, 2003), available at hup://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/202724. 
htm. 
9 Covad Communications, 398 F.3d at 676. 
10 Cregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No Economic 
Sense" Test, infra this issue, 73 ANTITRUST LJ. 413 (2006). 
11 A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice 
and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1247 (2005) [hereinafter Exclusionary Conduct]; 
A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct-Are There 
Unifying Principles? infra this issue, 73 ANTITRUST LJ. 375 (2006) [hereinafter Unifying 
Principles]. 
12 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
13 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw ~ 651d, at 79 (2d 
ed.2002). 
14 Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 CEO. MASON L. REv. 617, 64~7 (1999). 
15 Mark S. Poposky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the 
Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, infra this issue, 73 ANTITRUST LJ. 435 (2006) 
[hereinafter Antitrust Rules]. See also Mark S. Popofsky, Charting Antitrust's New Frontier, 9 
CEO. MASON L. REv. 565, 578 (2001) [hereinafter New Frontier]. 
16 The equally-efficient entrant standard is also discussed briefly in this article. 
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effect of exclusionary conduct on price and consumer welfare. This 
standard can be described in various ways: for example, as conduct that 
is "unreasonably exclusionary" or "unnecessarily restrictive," or simply 
as conduct that causes "consumer harm." Although this standard has 
been criticized, it can be implemented without causing excessive false 
positives that might lead to over-deterrence or a welfare-reducing dimi-
nution in innovation incentivesP Many of the criticisms of the consumer 
welfare standard are based on a misunderstanding of the workings of 
the standard relative to the profit-sacrifice test. In fact, the consumer 
welfare standard exhibits fewer potential over-deterrence and under-
deterrence errors in implementation. For example, the profit-sacrifice 
standard may well be more likely to condemn a cost-reducing investment 
that leads to market power than would the consumer welfare effect 
standard. 
II. COMPETING LEGAL STANDARDS 
While there are a number of alternative legal standards that could be 
used to govern allegedly exclusionary conduct under Section 2, the main 
focus of this article is on the profit-sacrifice standard and the consumer 
welfare effect standard. Comparison of the relative efficacy of these 
two standards involves the issue of optimal legal decision making with 
imperfect information, and the tension between over-deterrence (false 
positives) and under-deterrence (false negatives) .18 
A. THE BROOKE GROUP PREDATORY PRICING STANDARD, 
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT, AND RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 
The paradigmatic predatory pricing theory involves reducing price 
with the purpose and effect of causing rivals to exit from the market, 
generally by winning a war of attrition, and thereby allowing the predator 
to profit by raising price to the monopoly level. I9 In Brooke Group, the 
Supreme Court set out a two-part liability standard for predatory pricing 
that involves (1) evaluating whether the conduct involves below-cost 
pricing and (2) evaluating the likelihood of recoupment.20 The Brooke 
17 For example, when the market impact of exclusionary conduct involves an uncertain 
impact, a consumer welfare standard would evaluate the conduct on an ex ante (i.e., 
expectations) basis rather than an ex post (observed outcome) basis. 
18 The term "false positives" refers to erroneous convictions and the term "false negatives" 
refers to erroneous acquittals. 
19 The theory of predatory pricing underpinning the Brooke Group standard and the 
standard itself have been criticized by post-Chicago economists. See infra note 24. However, 
summarizing and developing those criticisms is beyond the scope of this article. 
20 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 
(1993). 
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Group standard, in principle, could be applied to all exclusionary con-
duct. A court could first evaluate whether the defendant's price exceeds 
its cost. If it does, then the conduct would not be condemned.21 If the 
price falls short of the cost, then the court would evaluate whether the 
defendant likely would be able to recoup its losses by exercising durable 
market power in the future. 
Obviously, this approach would constitute a very permissive standard 
with respect to non-predatory pricing exclusionary conduct. For example, 
payments to input suppliers to induce them to refuse to deal with rivals 
would be allowed unless the payments were so large that the defendant's 
overall profits turned negative. Similarly, burning down a rival's factory 
would not violate the antitrust laws as long as the arsonist's fee was 
modest and the predator charged a high output price, so that its price 
remained above its costs. Conduct that was used to maintain an existing 
monopoly would be treated more permissively because the defendant's 
initial price would be at the highly profitable monopoly level. 
Predatory pricing is one paradigmatic type of exclusionary conduct. 
Raising rivals' costs (RRC) is another paradigm. 22 RRC generally describes 
conduct to raise the costs of competitors with the purpose and effect of 
causing them to raise their prices or reduce their output, thereby allowing 
the excluding firm to profit by setting a supracompetitive price.23 Analysis 
consistent with the RRC paradigm is commonly applied to exclusivity 
arrangements that have the effect of raising rivals' distribution costs. 
RRC conduct is more likely to harm consumers than is predatory 
pricing for several reasons. First, unlike predatory pricing, or at least the 
21 This raises the issue of the definition of "below-cost," an issue that the Supreme Court 
explicitly did not decide in Brooke Group. Edlin and Farrell have pointed out that the test 
could mean simply non-profit-maximizing pricing or it might mean actually losing money 
on average. See Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A Chance to 
Clarify Predation Policy, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND 
POLICY 502, 510-17 (John E. Kwoka,Jr. & Lawrence]. White eds., 4th ed. 2004). 
22 Steven Salop & David SchefIman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (May 
1983); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986). The term "RRC" is preferable to 
the term "non-price predation," for several reasons. First, the conduct often does involve 
prices, in particular, input prices. Second, the term "predation" has become associated 
with causing victims to exit from the market, and RRC strategies often involve merely 
disadvantaging competitors without causing them to exit from the market. Third, courts 
might mechanically interpret the word "predation" as legally implying the appropriateness 
of the current legal tests for predatory pricing. See Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. 
Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying a profit-sacrifice test in an RRC 
context); supra note 7. 
23 See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22. Output reductions may occur in 
the short run and the long run, and could involve output reductions flowing from 
reduced innovation. 
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paradigmatic view of predatory pricing, successful RRC does not require 
a risky investment or associated profit sacrifice during an initial predatory 
period that may only be recouped at some later point in the future. 24 
Instead, recoupment often occurs simultaneously with the RRC conduct. 
Thus, it is more likely to succeed, which also means that it is more likely 
to be attempted. 
Second, unlike predatory pricing, successful RRC does not require the 
exit of rivals or even the permanent reduction in competitors' production 
capacity. If the marginal costs of established competitors are raised, those 
rivals will have the incentive to raise their prices and reduce their output, 
even if they remain viable. This also means that RRC is more likely to 
succeed and, therefore, is more likely to be attempted. 
Third, unlike paradigmatic predatory pricing intended to permit a 
deep pocket defendant to win a war of attrition, RRC is not necessarily 
more costly in the short run to the defendant than to its victims. For 
example, a threat may not be very costly to the perpetrator but could 
substantially raise the target firm's costs.25 A lower cost of excluding 
means that the conduct is more likely to succeed and, therefore, more 
likely to be attempted. 
Fourth, unlike predatory pricing, successful RRC does not always 
involve a short-term consumer benefit that mayor may not be over-
whelmed by longer-term consumer harm during the recoupment 
period.26 In RRC, rivals whose variable costs increase would have the 
incentive immediately to raise their prices or reduce their output. As a 
result, the consumer harm would occur immediately. Thus, there is more 
likely to be consumer harm from RRC than from predatory pricing. 
24 See generally Salop & Scheffman, sUfrra note 22; see also Krattenmaker & Salop, sufrra 
note 22, at 224. Economists have formulated additional-and sometimes more complex-
theories of predatory pricing that have market impacts closer to RRC conduct. See, e.g., 
Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTI-
TRUST LJ. 585, 590 (1994) [hereinafter Predatory Pricing]; Patrick Bolton et aI., Predatory 
Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. LJ. 2239, 2241 (2000); Aaron Edlin, Stopping 
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE LJ. 941 (2002). However, this article generally will 
focus on the conventional predatory pricing theory and how that paradigm differs from 
the RRC paradigm. 
25 Pushing up the market price of an input by increased purchasing could raise the 
marginal costS of an unintegrated rival by more than it would raise the cost of the integrated 
firm that carries out the overbuying. Oliver E. Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: 
The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 QJ. EcoN. 85 (1968); see also Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 669 (2005) [hereinafter Anti-
competitive Overbuying]; Susan A. Creighton et aI., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 975 
(2005). 
26 The immediate consumer benefit from the low "predatory" prices mayor may not be 
trumped by higher prices during a subsequent recoupment period. Concern with this 
tradeoff is endemic to all discussions of predatory pricing. 
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Fifth, unlike predatory pricing, RRC has an analogue to naked price 
fixing, what might be called "naked RRC," that is, exclusionary conduct 
where there are no valid efficiency benefits for the exclusion, for exam-
ple, when the defendant's claims are pretextual, noncognizable, or the 
benefits are insignificant.27 Such failed claims arise in Lorain Joumal,28 
fTC Petroieum,29 Conwood,30 and Dentsply.31 At the same time, however, 
consumer harm is not inevitable, even for naked RRC conduct. This is 
because there may be sufficient competition to prevent the defendant 
from raising prices in the output market. For example, if a firm burns 
down the factory of one out of many equally efficient competitors that 
lack expansion barriers, then the other competitors could increase their 
output and, thereby, maintain competitive prices.32 
27 In fact, what might be called "stark naked" RRC involves the extreme case of conduct 
when a firm approaches input suppliers that supply only its rivals (but not itself) and pays 
them to deny critical inputs to these rivals. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying, supra note 
25, at 684 n.37. Pre textual claims involve rationales invented by the defendant or its lawyers 
for litigation purposes. As stated in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, cognizable 
efficiencies are "efficiencies that have been verified by the Agencies, that do not arise 
from anticompetitive reductions in output or service, and that cannot be achieved through 
practical, significantly less restrictive means. Non-cognizable claims include conduct that 
amounts to a reduction in competition or that is not reasonably necessary to achieve the 
benefit or where there is no supporting evidence for the applicability of the rationale to 
the specific facts of the case." Federal Trade Comm 'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust 
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.36 (2000), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Competitor Collaboration 
Guidelines]. For example, in the context of Section I, the NCAA joint venture engaged 
in a variety of beneficial practices for college football. However, the Court concluded that 
its role in setting the price for 1V broadcasts lacked any valid benefits and led to higher 
prices and fewer games being telecast. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113-19 (1984). 
28 Lorain Journal suggests no procompetitive rationale for the newspaper's decision to 
offer only all-or-nothing exclusive contracts to advertisers. Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (adoption of exclusive advertising policy that deprived compet-
ing radio station of advertising revenue). 
29 Judge Richard Posner suggests that the sole purpose of denying asphalt to lTC was 
to prevent it from acting like a maverick competitor and disrupting an alleged price-fixing 
cartel of the other applicators who also bought asphalt from the suppliers. JTC Petroleum 
Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778-79 (7th Cir. 1999). 
!O In Conwood, there was no convincing efficiency justification for the defendant tobacco 
company destroying the display racks used by retailers for its competitors' products. 
Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002) 
SI In the Dentsply case, the exclusive arrangements, in principle, could have prevented 
free riding but the court concluded that the procompetitive justifications for the exclusivity 
were pretextual. United States v. Dentsply Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2005). 
S2 This raises the question of the appropriate legal standard for such naked exclusionary 
conduct. See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22. For example, in a speech given 
while he was at Antitrust Division, A. Douglas Melamed suggested that competitive harm 
might be inferred if there were no plausible procompetitive efficiency benefits, even if 
there is no proof of an impact on prices paid by consumers. A. Douglas Melamed, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exclusionary 
Vertical Agreements, Remarks Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, available at http:// 
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Not all RRC conduct is naked, of course. Some exclusionary conduct 
leads to cost savings, product improvements, or elimination of free riding. 
The existence of such benefits to the excluding firm does not necessarily 
mean that consumers gain an overall "net" benefit from the conduct. 
Evaluating the net impact on consumers would require comparing the 
magnitudes of the opposing forces leading to higher versus lower prices 
to see which is likely to be stronger. 
Because predatory pricing and RRC are so different, there is no reason 
to think that they should be governed by the same standards for antitrust 
liability. In fact, the Brooke Group standard is not generally proposed as 
the liability standard for exclusionary conduct other than predatory 
pricing. Instead, two other legal standards generally are discussed, the 
profit-sacrifice standard and the consumer welfare effect standard. The 
profit-sacrifice standard is closer to and grows out of the predatory pricing 
paradigm and the Brooke Group standard (though there are significant 
differences discussed below). 
The fact that RRC conduct generally raises more significant competi-
tive risks than predatory pricing suggests that a more restrictive legal 
standard is appropriate. RRC conduct can be evaluated effectively with 
a consumer welfare effect standard that evaluates whether the conduct 
harms competitors by raising their costs and whether those higher costs 
harm consumers and competition by allowing the defendant to achieve, 
maintain, or enhance monopoly power. 33 In carrying out this analysis, the 
procompetitive rationales for the conduct would be taken into account in 
evaluating the overall competitive impact of the conduct on consumers. 
B. THE PROFIT-SACRIFICE STANDARD34 
The profit-sacrifice standard is an intellectual descendant of the below-
cost prong of the Brooke Group predatory pricing standard, generalized 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1623.httn. See also Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Inno-
vation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 CEO. MASON L. REv. 485 (1999) 
[hereinafter Promoting Innovation]; Creighton et aI., supra note 25. 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("although 
Microsoft did not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, it did bar them from the 
cost-efficient ones"); Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 189,191-96. In Aspen Skiing, the Court also was 
concerned about increases in the plaintiff's distribution costs. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985). 
!14 For a variety of other analyses of the profit-sacrifice test for exclusionary conduct, see 
Edlin & Farrell, supra note 21; Janusz A Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Access and Bundling 
in High-Technology Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOIT MONOPOLY: 
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 103-28 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. 
Lenard eds., 1999) [hereinafter Access and Bundling] ; Einer Elhauge, Defining Betler Monapoli-
z.ation Standards, 56 STANFORD L. REv. 253 (2003); Andrew I. Cavil, Dominant Firm Distribu-
tion: Striking a Betler Balance, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Dominant Firm 
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for more complex non-price exclusion scenarios.35 The profit-sacrifice 
test examines the profitability of the defendant's conduct relative to 
a hypothetical market outcome that is used as the non-exclusionary 
benchmark. The hypothetical "but-for" marketplace is one in which it 
is impossible to raise prices following the exclusionary conduct. When 
exclusionary conduct potentially raises barriers to competition in some 
way, a defendant's exclusionary conduct can be said to sacrifice profits 
if the conduct would have been unprofitable (and, thus, likely not under-
taken) in the absence of those enhanced barriers to competition. This 
basic idea can be formulated in various ways.36 
Recently, Gregory Werden and A. Douglas Melamed have suggested 
a variation on this standard that Werden refers to as the "no economic 
sense" test and which places less emphasis on the level of profits sacri-
ficed. 37 As stated in Department of Justice Brief in Trinko, the standard 
evaluates whether conduct "would make no economic sense for the 
defendant but for the tendency to eliminate or lessen competition."38 
That is, the conduct would not be profit-maximizing absent its anticom-
petitive effect. This variation is primarily different from the conventional 
profit-sacrifice standard because it does not require a showing that there 
Distribution]; Mark R. Patterson, The Sacrifice of Profits in Non-Price Predation, 18 ANTITRUST 
LJ. 37 (2003); Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11; Melamed, Unifying Principles, 
supra note 11; John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F244 (2005); Werden, 
supra note 10. 
35 Werden, supra note 10, at 422 n.35, takes issue with this historical characterization of 
the profit-sacrifice test as a more general version of the below-cost pricing test for predatory 
pricing. Whatever the chronology, the below-cost pricing test is a specific application of 
the profit-sacl'ifice standard. Not that anyone today (except the participants) still care 
about how events of 25 years were perceived at the time, but there was great intellectual 
turmoil among economists over the Areeda-Turner test and it was in that context that the 
original Ordover and Willig article, infra note 36, was written. See also STRA TEG Y, PREDATION, 
AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (Steven C. Salop ed., FTC 1981) (containing final versions of 
articles presented at a FTC conference held in 1980). 
56 Robert Bork formulates the test as identifying business practices that "would not be 
considered profit-maximizing except for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be driven 
from the market, leaving the predator with a market share sufficient to command monopoly 
profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the 
predator finds inconvenient or threatening." BORK, supra note 2, at 144. Janusz Ordover 
and Robert Willig formulate the test as a "response to a rival that sacrifices part of the 
profit that could be earned under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain 
viable, in order to induce exit and gain consequent monopoly profits." Janusz A. Ordover 
& Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 
YALE LJ. 8 (1981) [hereinafter Predation]. See also Ordover & Willig, Access and Bundling, 
supra note 34, at 9. As discussed in more detail below, the various formulations of the test 
could lead to different results in practice. 
37 Werden, supra note 10, at 413. Melamed terms this test the "sacrifice" or "business 
sense" test. Melamed, Unifying Principles, supra note 11, at 391-92. 
38 See Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 15; see also Pate, supra note 8. 
HeinOnline -- 73 Antitrust L.J. 320 2005-2006
320 ANTITRUST LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 73 
is a period of time in which the defendant's profits are lower than they 
were before the exclusionary conduct was undertaken. The reduction in 
profits can be conceptual rather than temporal,39 Although this standard 
shares many obvious similarities with the standard version of the profit-
sacrifice test, the no economic sense conceptualization does resolve some 
of the implementation pitfalls of the typical profit-sacrifice formulation 
discussed in this article.40 
As a literal matter, the profit-sacrifice standard is a test of anticompeti-
tive purpose and intent. That is, if a profit-maximizing firm engages 
in conduct that would not be economically rational (i.e., maximally 
profitable) absent a reduction in competition, then it can be inferred 
that the firm must have intended to cause the anticompetitive effect. 
The Supreme Court discussed this role of the profit-sacrifice test to infer 
anticompetitive intent in Aspen Skiing41 and Trinko.42 For example, in 
Trinko, the Court stated that "[t]he unilateral termination ofa voluntary 
(and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness 
to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end."43 
Recently, commentators have suggested that the profit-sacrifice test 
alternatively could be made the only permissible evidence of anticompeti-
tive purpose or even could be declared the sole liability standard.44 This 
was the position of the government in its amicus brief at the petition 
stage in Trinko.45 Covad also seems to take this position.46 The mechanics 
of the profit-sacrifice test can be illustrated generally with the following 
39 Werden characterizes the counterfactual as altering the competition faced by the 
defendant, not the defendant's market power. Werden, supra note 10, at 416 n.lO. 
40 On the similarities of the "no economic sense" variant to other profit-sacrifice formula-
tions, see also Vickers, supra note 34, at F253. The remainder of this article will refer to 
the profit-sacrifice test as including the no economic sense formulation, except where it 
is necessary to distinguish between the formulations. 
41 In rejecting Ski Co.'s efficiency claims, and concluding in essence that Ski Co. was 
motivated solely by anticompetitive intent, the Court utilized a version of the profit-sacrifice 
test that looked to ticket revenues forgone by the refusal to cooperate with Highlands. 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-09 (1985). But see 
Elhauge, supra note 34, at 287-88. 
42 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
409-10 (2004). 
43 [d. at 409. In Trinko, the Court characterized part of Ski Co. 's conduct in the Aspen Skiing 
case as motivated by anticompetitive intent in a similar way, stating that "the defendant's 
unwillingness to renew the ticket even if compensated at retail price revealed a distinctly 
anticompetitive bent." [d. 
44 See generaUy Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra note 11; Patterson, supra note 34; 
Werden, supra note 10. 
45 See Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 15; see also Pate, supra note 8. 
46 Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See 
also supra note 8. 
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conceptual example. Suppose that a dominant firm with monopoly power 
but competing with a small competitor initially is earning profits with 
a net present value of $700. Suppose further that the dominant firm 
contemplates engaging in some type of exclusionary conduct that raises 
its only rival's cost very substantially and, thereby, causes it to exit. The 
dominant firm anticipates that if the exclusionary conduct is undertaken 
but for some reason would fail to raise the competitor's costs and cause 
it to exit, the dominant firm's profits would be reduced by $100, down 
to $600. However, suppose that the firm's internal analysis concludes 
the rival would exit and the market price would rise after the exclusionary 
conduct is undertaken. As a result, the conduct would be profitable on 
balance once its impact on price and exit is taken into account, raising 
the dominant firm's anticipated profits from the initial level of $700 up 
to $900. 
This conduct would be condemned under the profit-sacrifice test. The 
dominant firm would not have the economic incentive to undertake the 
exclusionary conduct absent its effect on exit and the resulting price 
increase because the exclusionary conduct would have been unprofit-
able, leading to a $lOO profit reduction. Thus, the conduct would not 
have made "economic sense.» It is only the anticipated exit-inducing and 
price-raising effect that tips the scales in the firm's profitability analysis. 
Because the exclusionary conduct would have led to higher prices, the 
application of the profit-sacrifice test to these facts also protects con-
sumer welfare. 
The profit-sacrifice test, in principle, can be applied to any type of 
exclusionary conduct, although the analysis is simpler for some types of 
conduct than for others. The exact way in which the profit-sacrifice 
standard is implemented can affect the determination of whether or not 
allegedly exclusionary conduct passes muster, and there is debate over 
the proper way to implement the standard, particularly the assumption 
regarding the defendant's output.47 In this article, I assume the profit-
sacrifice test is implemented by measuring profits relative to a benchmark 
of the market price that would have occurred absent the allegedly anti-
competitive conduct. 
In order to understand how the profit-sacrifice test is used in practice, 
the following discussion applies that standard to a variety of types of 
47 For example, Ordover and Willig focus on conduct that does not simply disadvantage 
competitors, but actually causes them to exit. They refer to the benchmark as the profit 
that could be earned "under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain viable." 
This requires that the terms "under competitive conditions" and "were the rival to remain 
viable" be defined in a way that the standard can be implemented by a court. See Ordover 
& Willig, Predation, supra note 36, at 8. 
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conduct-inducement of refusals to deal, incompatible design change, 
and predatory pricing-that illustrate how the test can be applied to 
exclusionary conduct by a firm as a way of achieving, maintaining, or 
enhancing monopoly power. 
1. Inducing Refusals to Deal by Independent Input Suppliers 
The profit-sacrifice test can be applied to a payment to suppliers for 
a refusal to deal. For example, suppose that a dominant firm is currently 
selling 500 units at a price of $60 per unit and produces that output at 
a constant marginal cost of $50 per unit. Thus, the firm has a profit-
margin of $10 per unit (i.e., $60 - $50) and operating profits on the 
500 uni ts equal to $5000. Assume further that if the firm's closest com peti-
tor is denied access to a critical input, the firm would be able to raise 
its price to $100 and increase its market share and total volume by 100 
units. This is because the disadvantaged competitor would have the 
incentive to reduce its output and raise its own price.48 Suppose that 
the dominant firm enters into exclusionary vertical agreements with the 
critical input suppliers to refuse to supply the competitor, pays these 
input suppliers a total of $3000 for the refusal to deal agreements, and 
no efficiency benefits (e.g., elimination of free riding) are generated by 
the agreements. 
Based on these facts, this exclusionary conduct is anticompetitive. It 
leads to higher prices paid by consumers. Assuming that there are no 
offsetting consumer information or product quality benefits that might 
occur if the conduct had eliminated free riding, consumer welfare surely 
would fall. Consumer welfare also would fall if there were modest benefits 
that were insufficient to reverse or offset the higher prices.49 
Furthermore, this conduct would fail the profit-sacrifice test: It would 
make "no economic sense" for the firm to pay the suppliers $3000 unless 
the payment would permit the firm to increase the price it could charge 
to consumers. This is certainly true at the dominant firm's initial output 
level. In fact, if the only impact of the refusal to deal in this example 
were that the firm would be able to increase its sales by 100 units at a 
constant price of $60, this would contribute incremental profits of only 
$1000 (i.e., 100 units @ $10 profit margin). Thus, its profits in this 
hypothetical, but-for world, where price remains at $60, would fall by 
$2000 (i.e., $3000 - $1000). What makes the conduct profitable, on 
48 At the higher price, the total market demand would be lower. But, the dominant firm 
can expand its own volume (and market share) by absorbing customers from the now-
higher cost rival, which would have an incentive to shrink. 
49 Assessing this tradeoff is discussed in more detail in the product design and cost-
reducing investment examples below. 
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balance, for the dominant firm is that the refusal to deal agreements 
allow the firm to raise its price by $40 per unit up to $100 on the 600 
units that it can sell. 
However, suppose that the required payments to input suppliers are 
only $500. In this case, consumer welfare still falls because the price rises 
by $40, with no offsetting consumer benefits. But the evaluation of profit-
sacrifice in this case raises the issue ofthe proper treatment of the profits 
on the 100 units of incremental retail sales at the but-for benchmark 
price of $60. These profits might be counted as "legitimate" profits 
because the units are sold at the non-exclusionary price of $60. In 
contrast, they might be viewed as "illegitimate" or anticompetitive profits 
because the units would not be sold absent the allegedly exclusionary 
conduct. 50 This assumption is a contentious issue and often may deter-
mine whether or not there is a finding of profit-sacrifice. 
2. Incompatible Design Change 
The profit-sacrifice test similarly can be applied to the controversial fact 
situation of a product design change by a dominant firm with monopoly 
power.51 Suppose that a dominant firm makes a design change that 
improves the quality and value of its product to users by $5.52 However, 
at the same time, suppose that the improved design change necessarily 
also reduces the compatibility of the monopolist's product with compet-
ing products. That is, the incompatibility is "inextricably linked" to the 
quality improvement.53 Moreover, suppose that it is not feasible to 
50 The analytic issue is how to implement the concept of "absent the anticompetitive 
effect of the conduct." As discussed below, the lack of consensus over this implementa-
tion issue would make the profit-sacrifice test more subjective in practice. Defining non-
exclusionary profits is discussed in more detail below in Part IV.C. A court cannot simply 
conclude that the profits are (or are not) legitimate on the grounds that the conduct 
extrinsically is (or is not) procompetitive. This is because the proper role of antitrust 
standards is to determine whether the conduct is procompetitive, not the other way around. 
51 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54-57 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
52 That is, suppose that the firm would be able to raise its price by $5 if there were not 
a change in the degree of competition provided by other firms. Sometimes courts in 
contract cases assume perfectly competitive markets and use the market price as the 
measure of consumer value. That measure assumes generally that consumers could pur-
chase an identical unit from another seller and that sellers lack market power. Equating 
value to price is inappropriate in antitrust. Mter all, that assumption would lead to a 
conclusion that monopolization increases the value of a product because its price rises 
from the competitive level up to the monopoly level. 
53 The "inextricably linked" language is taken from the discussion of efficiencies in the 
current version of the Horizon tal Merger Guidelines. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade 
Comm'n Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 n.36 (1992, revised 1997), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11251.pdf [hereinafter Merger Guidelines J. 
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continue selling the old compatible product. In this case, the incompati-
bility is not a naked restraint.54 
Suppose that the incompatibility creates significant barriers to compe-
tition to existing competitors and causes enhanced barriers to entry. 
The dominant firm consequently gains the ability to raise its price by 
far more than the $5 quality improvement. For example, suppose that 
the dominant firm is able profitably to raise its price by $50, which it does. 
This product improvement might or might not be condemned under 
the profit-sacrifice test. The outcome of the test would depend on the 
cost of the product improvement. As a hypothetical matter, if there were 
no barriers to competition caused by the reduction in compatibility (and 
holding outputs constant), the simplest economic model might predict 
that the firm would only have had the ability and incentive to raise the 
price of its product by $5, which is equivalent to the magnitude of the 
product improvement.55 That would be the benchmark price increase 
for the test. The profit-sacrifice test then would condemn the design 
change if the investment necessary to achieve the $5 product perfor-
mance benefits were so high that the investment would not have made 
economic sense absent the ability to raise price by more than the $5. 
The profit-sacrifice test compares the additional costs to the firm from 
the design change against the additional price it could charge in the 
hypothetical world. For example, suppose that there are no incremental 
investment costs but the variable costs of the higher quality product are 
$15 per unit higher than the old product. In this case, it would not be 
rational for the dominant firm to spend $15 per unit to gain the power 
to raise its price by $5 per unit (holding output constant). Thus, if the 
firm chose to adopt the design change in the but-for world, it would 
sacrifice profit of $10 per unit. 
A court applying the profit-sacrifice test could conclude that a rational 
profit-maximizing firm would not have adopted the design change unless 
54 If, contrary to the assumptions of the example, the old design could continue to be 
sold or if the incompatible product design were more expensive than a compatible design 
that delivers the same quality improvement, then the design easily would be condemned 
under the profit-sacrifice test. In this situation, the extra cost of creating the incompatibility 
would be the focus of the complaint, not the product improvement. It would be argued 
that the firm could have achieved the $5 quality improvement at lower cost. The only 
rationale for spending more to create an incompatible product would be to permit the 
price to be increased by more. A consumer welfare effect standard also would condemn 
this conduct, though the reasoning would be different. 
55 More complicated economic models might be formulated in which the price increase 
would be more or less than $5. Thus, selecting the proper model often would be a 
contentious issue if the profit-sacrifice test were used in practice. This issue is discussed 
in more detail infra Part IV.C. 
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it anticipated that it would be able to raise price by more than $15, its 
cost per unit to produce the higher quality product, without losing any 
sales. Stated differently, the firm must have anticipated that the design 
change would give it the monopoly power profitably to raise price by 
far more than the increase in product performance quality. As set out in 
the hypothetical, the firm also anticipates that the barriers to competition 
flowing from the incompatibility give it the monopoly power to raise 
price by $50. 
This particular design change would violate the consumer welfare 
effect test as well as the profit-sacrifice test, although the reasoning 
is somewhat different. The consumer welfare effect test compares the 
additional performance benefits to consumers (here, $5) to the addi-
tional price they must pay (here, $50). It is obvious that rational consum-
ers would have preferred the old product at the old price. 
In contrast, if the design change would cost only $3 more per unit 
and the performance benefits were $5, then the conduct would not 
be condemned by the profit-sacrifice test. At the hypothetical $5 price 
increase in the benchmark world, the firm's profits would rise by $2 per 
unit. In this case, the ability to raise price by more than $5 is not necessary 
to achieve an increase in profits. However, this design change still would 
be condemned under the consumer welfare effect standard because the 
price in the real world increases by $50, whereas the value of the product 
increases by only $5. This shows that the competitive impact of the 
new product design still is clearly adverse to consumers. Only if the 
performance benefits exceed $50 would consumers benefit when the 
reasonably anticipated price increase is $50. Thus, the profit-sacrifice 
standard is more permissive than the consumer welfare standard in this 
type of case. The design change satisfies the profit-sacrifice standard as 
long as the performance benefits of the product improvement exceed 
the cost of the design change, whereas it satisfies the consumer welfare 
standard only if the performance benefits exceed the price increase. 
Werden goes further. He suggests that courts would and should apply 
a "prudential safe harbor" to such new product introductions, as well 
as cost-reducing investments.56 This safe harbor would immunize such 
conduct from antitrust liability, even if it fails the profit-sacrifice (or no 
economic sense) test. 57 
56 Werden, supra note 10, at 418 & nn.21-25. See also Popofsky, Antitrust Rules, supra 
note 15. 
57 Werden, supra note 10, at 421-22, also would not apply the no economic sense standard 
to the "scenarios" where "the inevitable outcome of the competitive process would be a 
single surviving competitor" and "aggressive competitive tactics may be required for survival, 
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In my view, this methodology would make the analysis circular and 
the standard an empty shell. The rationale for using an antitrust standard 
is to determine rigorously and objectively whether or not alleged exclu-
sionary conduct is anticompetitive or whether it is "competition on the 
merits," not vice versa. If a court separately has already postulated for 
other extrinsic reasons that certain exclusionary conduct is "competition 
on the merits," then there is no reason to use the standard. Finally, such 
safe harbors obviously also would require far more justification than the 
perceived "experience" of the court or commentator because of the 
conscious or unconscious role of ideology in perceiving reality. Only in 
this way can courts maintain the rigor and coherence of antitrust, rather 
than reducing it simply to a subjective reflection of the court's gen-
eral ideology. 
3. Predatory Pricing 
Brooke Group does not use a true profit-sacrifice standard but rather a 
negative-profit standard.58 However, if a true profit-sacrifice standard were 
applied to predatory pricing, it would be less permissive (i.e., more 
interventionist) than the below-cost pricing test. To illustrate, suppose 
that a monopolist has always priced at the monopoly level of $100. At 
some point, suppose that a unique new competitor enters the market 
and the monopolist cuts price drastically. Suppose that the low price 
saps the entrant's financial resources and causes it to exit permanently 
from the market.59 Suppose that a profit-sacrifice standard were being 
used, rather than the Brooke Group below-cost pricing test. In order to 
implement the profit-sacrifice test properly, it would be necessary to 
determine the price to use as the non-exclusionary benchmark for the 
test. 
A court might be tempted to treat the pre-entry monopoly price ($100, 
in the example) as the non-exclusionary price benchmark for evaluating 
profit sacrifice. However, if this price were used as the benchmark, then 
yet such tactics would make sense only because of a tendency to eliminate competition." 
Courts might not treat this situation as so rare. A defendant might argue that it should 
apply to a broad range of exclusionary conduct by a monopolist to maintain its monopoly 
in the face of entry by an efficient new competitor, if the monopolist can successfully 
argue that the market involves strong network effects or if the market is a natural monopoly. 
In contrast, the consumer welfare effect standard would evaluate whether or not the 
exclusionary conduct would harm competition, that is, whether it would increase price 
and reduce output. 
58 For a similar pOint, see Elhauge, supra note 34, at 272-74. 
59 Suppose that the entrant could neither simply reduce output without exiting nor re-
enter in the event that the defendant subsequently increases its price, which implies that 
recoupment would be likely. Note also that I am assuming away other potential rationales 
for the low prices, such as promotional pricing of new products. 
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any price decrease below the initial monopoly level would be found to 
involve profit-sacrifice. Using a pre-entry monopoly price as the bench-
mark could lead to false positives because the profit-sacrifice test would 
catch welfare-enhancing price competition in response to entry into a 
monopolized market as well as attempts to drive rivals out of business 
in the hope of raising prices after their exit. 
Thus, the initial monopoly price would not be the proper non-
exclusionary benchmark for the profit-sacrifice test. The proper bench-
mark is the market price that would prevail if the entrant had sufficient 
financial resources to survive a price war (i.e., if there would be no exit 
for the rival and no recoupment for the predator). Mter entry into the 
monopolized market, the now-former monopolist generally would have 
an incentive to reduce its price to compete, even ifit were not attempting 
to start a war of attrition to cause the entrant to exit from the market. 50 
In most cases, the firm would not cut its price all the way down to 
marginal cost, and marginal cost pricing is unlikely to be the oligopoly 
market equilibrium if the entrant remained a viable competitor.61 Thus, 
the Brooke Group below-cost pricing test does not measure true profit-
sacrifice.62 
60 If the entrant has very limited capacity and no ability to grow, it is possible that the 
monopolist instead might maximize its profits by holding its price at the monopoly level 
and ceding this limited number of sales to the new entrant, rather than reducing price 
to all of its customers. However, this scenario would be the exception, not the rule. See 
Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Pley, and the Lean and 
Hungry Look, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 361 (1984); Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, Judo 
Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition, 14 BELL]. ECON. 315, 315 (1983). 
61 Marginal cost pricing would be the market equilibrium only under very limited market 
conditions: the firms sell perfectly homogeneous products; the firms are equally efficient; 
and each firm assumes that its price choice will have no impact on its rival's price. In 
contrast, price equal to marginal cost would not be the outcome for a duopoly market 
where the incumbent and an equally efficient entrant sell differentiated products. Nor 
would it be the outcome if the incumbent and the entrant would tacitly coordinate 
imperfectly, again assuming that the entrant remained viable. In either case, if the entrant 
remained viable, the equilibrium market prices would exceed the firms' marginal costs. 
62 Ordover and Willig recognized this issue in their article on the role of profit-sacrifice 
test in predatory pricing. However, they chose to use the profit level at the perfectly 
competitive outcome (i.e., where price equals marginal cost) as one key benchmark for 
their modified profit-sacrifice test. They refer to this modified benchmark with the proviso 
that it is the outcome "under competitive conditions." See Ordover & Willig, Predation, 
sUfrra note 36, at 10. Werden states that the no economic sense test can only be properly 
applied if "the defendant's choices can be narrowed down to a few, only one of which 
includes the challenged conduct." Werden, sufrra note 10, at 420. In predatory pricing, 
there is a continuum of price choices so the test could not be properly applied, if a court 
wanted to do so, instead of simply making a price-cost comparison. Brooke Group is not a 
true profit-sacrifice standard for another reason. The recoupment prong of that standard 
evaluates whether the defendant's investment in predation likely would be profitable, not 
whether it would be unprofitable absent any price-raising effect. It is a test of the rationality 
of the overall strategy, not the irrationality of the conduct in a hypothetical world. For 
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It might be argued that a price equal to marginal cost is a good non-
exclusionary price benchmark because that price level would be efficient 
and, therefore, not anticompetitive. However, this defense of using mar-
ginal cost as the benchmark for the profit-sacrifice test is circular, as 
discussed above. 
C. THE EQUALLY EFFICIENT COMPETITOR STANDARD 
Another possible rationale for the below-cost pricing standard in Brooke 
Group is to protect an equally-efficient entrant from being excluded from 
the market. Judge Posner has suggested applying this standard to all 
exclusionary conduct, not just predatory pricing: under the equally effi-
cient competitor standard, the plaintiff would need to prove that the 
conduct "is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's 
market an equally or more efficient competitor."63 
The fundamental problem with applying the equally efficient entrant 
standard to RRC conduct is that the unencumbered (potential) entry 
of less-efficient competitors often raises consumer welfare. For example, 
consider the simplest example of limit pricing by a monopolist that has 
obtained its monopoly legitimately with superior skill, foresight, and 
industry. Suppose that this monopolist has variable costs of $20, and 
initially charges the unconstrained monopoly price of $50, when the 
monopolist faces no threat of entry.64 
Now suppose that there is a new entry threat by a less-efficient firm 
with variable costs of $40. Facing this threat, the monopolist would have 
the incentive to reduce its price to the "limit price" of $39 in order to 
deter the entry into the monopolized market. This potential entrant 
would not produce any output but it would act as a perceived potential 
entrant, constraining the monopolist's price by waiting in the wings. Its 
potential for entry reduces price, increases market output, and raises 
both consumer welfare and total economic welfare.65 
further discussion of recoupment as an "investment test," see Kenneth C. Elzinga & David 
E. Mills, Testingfor Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1989). 
63 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 194-95 (2d ed. 
2001). Posner would also require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has monopoly 
power. The defendant could rebut by showing that the conduct is efficient. For other 
commentaries on this standard, see Elhauge, supra note 37, at 273; Ken Heyer, A World 
of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 375, 419 n.64 
(2005) (quotingJoseph Farrell, Comments at Antitrust Division Conference on the Devel-
opments in the Law and Economics of Exclusionary Pricing Practices (Mar. 18, 2004»; 
Cavil, Dominant Finn Distribution, supra note 34, at 59-61; Vickers, supra note 34, at F256. 
64 Assume for simplicity of the example that the firm has no sunk capital or fixed costs 
and its variable costs are constant for all output levels. 
65 There would be a reduction in "production efficiency" if the entrant actually produced 
output because its costs are higher than the monopolist's. But, it does not produce any 
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Suppose next that the monopolist engages in naked RRC conduct that 
raises the entrant's costs above $50. For example, suppose that it raises 
the entrant's costs by $12 to a cost of $52. The entrant then would lose 
the ability to prevent the monopolist from charging the monopoly price 
of $50. As a result, consumers would be harmed by the RRC conduct, 
and total welfare would fall. 
However, no antitrust liability would attach to this RRC conduct under 
Posner's equally efficient entrant rule. This is because a $12 cost increase 
would not deter an equally efficient potential entrant with costs of $20. 
If the monopolist were to maintain its price at the $50 monopoly price, 
that equally efficient entrant would still be able to enter successfully 
even if its costs increased from $20 to $32. 
This example may be simple and somewhat stylized, but it is certainly 
within the mainstream of antitrust. The idea that a perceived potential 
entrant can constrain the pricing of a monopolist is a central idea in 
the analysis of entry barriers, potential competition, and market power. 
If the equally efficient entrant standard fails in this simple RRC example, 
then it also is likely to be significantly flawed for evaluating non-price 
exclusionary conduct more generally.66 
D. THE CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECT STANDARD 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is concerned with agreements that 
"unreasonably" restrain trade.67 This standard generally is interpreted as 
an anticompetitive effect test that focuses on the net impact on consumer 
welfare, that is, market price and outpUt.68 This same type of fact-based 
output. Note also that production efficiency benefits not passed on to consumers would 
not count as part of consumer welfare. 
66 For example, in discussing this standard in the context of a fraudulent patent claim, 
Professor Hovenkamp states that it would be "unreasonably lenient and even perverse. It 
exonerates the defendant in precisely those circumstances when the conduct is most likely 
to be unreasonably exclusionary." Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 
U. CHI. L. REv. 147, 154 (2005). 
67 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard 
Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
68 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, lO3-04 (1984). Note that there is also 
controversy over whether the appropriate antitrust goal is consumer welfare or aggregate 
welfare (i.e., efficiencies), as suggested by Bork's use of the Williamson diagram. BORK, 
supra note 2, at 107-lO (citing Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The 
Welfare TradeoJJs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968)). For criticisms of Bork's position, see 
Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers 
(Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L. REv. 959, (1999); John Kirkwood, Consumers, 
Economics and Antitrust, 21 REs. IN L. & ECON. 1 (2004). With respect to exclusiohary 
conduct, the aggregate welfare standard is inconsistent with a view that antitrust is for the 
protection of consumers rather than competitors. Consider the following two examples. 
First, in an exclusionary conduct case under Section 2, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff 
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competitive effects analysis could be applied to exclusionary conduct 
under Section 2. Under this standard, one would conclude that exclusion-
ary conduct violates the antitrust laws if it reduces competition without 
creating a sufficient improvement in performance to fully offset these 
potential adverse effect on prices and thereby prevent consumer harm.69 
Such conduct could be labeled "unreasonably exclusionary."7o 
This is a very general antitrust standard. For example, if the fact-
based analysis indicates that the exclusionary conduct likely increases or 
maintains barriers to competition or entry and likely leads to higher 
prices, then the exclusionary conduct would be condemned unless the 
evidence of likely and substantial procompetitive benefits is so strong 
that consumers are unlikely to be harmed. This analysis would involve 
a variety of evidence relevant to evaluating competitive effect, including 
both structural and behavioral evidence, and would be tightly focused 
on determining the impact on consumers. Profit-sacrifice evidence also 
could be relevant, but proof of profit sacrifice would be neither necessary 
nor sufficient to a liability finding. 
This competitive effects-based antitrust standard essentially would 
compare the beneficial and harmful competitive aspects of the alleged 
exclusionary conduct in order to determine the overall impact on con-
sumers. This is the type of competitive effects analysis contemplated in 
the Merger Guidelines.7l It is not intended to be an open-ended inquiry 
or involve "some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and 
credits."72 Despite the use of the technical economic term "consumer 
to prove significant injury to competitors. The plaintiff must also show injury to consumers. 
Under a total welfare standard, harm to competitors would be a cognizable harm, indepen-
dent of the harm to consumers. Indeed, harm to competitors would be given the same 
weight as benefits to consumers. In fact, harm to competitors could be used to trump 
smaller consumer benefits. Second, suppose that a low cost firm hires an arsonist to destroy 
the factory of its higher cost competitor. That conduct would increase the efficiency of 
market production by moving production from the high cost firm to the low cost firm. 
If the resulting price increase is not too large, aggregate welfare nonetheless would rise 
from this exclusionary conduct but consumer welfare would fall. Yet, it seems clear that 
no court would permit the efficiency defense in this case. See Salop & Romaine, supra 
note 14, at 646-47; Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust 
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard (Working Paper, Nov. 
2005) (manuscript on file with author). 
69 These competitive benefits are often referred to the as the "efficiencies" created by 
the conduct. For example, suppose that a merger to monopoly would increase prices from 
$50 to $100 if it had no impact on costs. However, suppose that the merger also reduces 
the marginal costs of the merged firm by 30%. That cost decrease would tend to push 
price below $100, but not necessarily to $50 or less. Only if the price remains at $50 or 
less would consumer harm be avoided. 
70 Hovenkamp, sUfrra note 66, at 155. 
71 See Merger Guidelines, supra note 53, § 2. 
72 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). 
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welfare," the evaluation is really about whether consumers are harmed 
from higher prices, reduced quality, or (in some cases) reduced innova-
tion Thus, a better term might well be a "consumer harm" standard 
rather than a "consumer welfare effect" standard.73 
A useful reference point is the type of competitive effects analysis of 
"market power harms" in mergers suggested by the Merger Guidelines.74 
In the analysis of unilateral competitive effect, for example, the recapture 
of customers diverted to one's merger partner creates upward price 
pressure. Cost savings generated by the merger potentially create down-
ward price pressure. The competitive threat of entry and repositioning 
also constrains the upward price pressure. Putting together the evidence 
on these three elements permits the agency or court to gauge the likely 
net effect of the merger on prices and output. This same type of competi-
tive analysis can be applied to exclusionary conduct under Section 2. 
Thus, alternative names for the standard could be a "competitive effect" 
or "competitive injury" standard. 
The exact name of the standard is not important. What is important 
is that this test focuses on the effect of the conduct on the market, 
that is, consumers and the competitive process. In contrast, the other 
standards-profit sacrifice, no economic sense, equally efficient 
competitor-are focused instead on the impact of the conduct on the 
alleged miscreant. This is the key reason why the other standards are 
flawed. 
The role of balancing in the consumer welfare effect standard is a 
potential source of confusion.75 In carrying out this analysis, the courts 
would not engage in self-conscious, open-ended balancing of the magni-
tudes of benefits and harms using some subjective social weighting.76 
The consumer welfare effect test is not like the situation envisioned 
under a Williamsonian total welfare (efficiencies) standard, where harm 
suffered by consumers is balanced off against the benefits gained by the 
monopolist.77 This consumer welfare analysis is more geared towards 
73 Vickers, supra note 34, at F258. 
74 See Merger Guidelines, supra note 53, § 2.2. 
75 I am one source of this confusion, having previously referred to the consumer welfare 
effect standard as a balancing test, apparently without sufficient clarification of the use of 
the term. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 14, at 618. 
76 See Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 11 n.2 ("The application of Section 2 
does not entail an open-ended '"balancing" of social gains against competitive harms.' 
and 'a firm is under no obligation to sacrifice its own profits,' but unlawful exclusionary 
acts are those that 'do not benefit consumers ... or ... produce harms disproportionate 
to the resulting benefits.'") (citing 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, m1651a, 658f, 
at 72, 131-132, 135). 
77 BORK, supra note 2, at 107-10. 
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comparing the magnitudes of various effects to predict the likely overall 
impact on consumers.78 
The finder of fact generally would compare and weigh the magnitude 
and credibility of evidence on both the procompetitive and anticompeti-
tive sides to evaluate which evidence is stronger on balance.79 Juries 
routinely weigh the credibility of opposing experts with differing views 
of the net effect of the challenged conduct. Alternatively, instead of 
formally comparing the effect on price and quality impacts of the 
increased market power with the lower costs and superior product perfor-
mance, a court may reach the same result by setting the competitive 
benefits standard higher the greater are the market power harms shown.80 
For example, in a case in which the plaintiff has shown significant market 
power harms, the court may be more likely to find that the defendant 
has failed to demonstrate its benefits claims. 
Similarly, in merger law, courts use a sliding-scale standard in which 
more compelling rebuttal evidence is required for a stronger prima facie 
case set out by the government. For example, as explained by Judge 
(now Justice) Thomas in Baker Hughes, the defendant can rebut a prima 
facie case by demonstrating that the merger will not have anticompeti-
tive effects.81 
The more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the 
defendant must present to rebut it successfully. A defendant can make 
the required showing by affirmatively showing why a given transaction 
78 In the context of deciding whether to apply the per se rule to a category of conduct, 
the Court in Sylvania described the evidentiary balancing as follows: "The probability 
that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those 
consequences must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences." Continental 
T.V. v. CTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,50 n.16 (1977). In evaluating an entire category 
of conduct, some fraction of the particular uses of the conduct by particular firms may 
lead to harm and some other fraction of particular uses by other firms may lead to benefits, 
and the probabilities are applied to the fraction of each outcome. Similarly, in evaluating 
a specific use of the conduct by a specific firm under a fact-based rule of reason, the 
relevant probabilities would be the likelihoods that the use of the conduct by the specific 
firm at a specific time would lead to either higher or lower prices and consumer welfare. 
79 That the consumer welfare effect analysis is stated in a quantitative way in this article 
and others is not unexpected in an area like antitrust, which is now so firmly rooted in 
economic analysis. But, it generally would not be necessary for the fact finder to attach 
numbers to the probabilities and strength of the evidence on each side. As Judge Posner 
put the point in the context of his algebraic formula for deciding whether to grant a 
preliminary i~unction, the formula "is intended not to force analysis into a quantitative 
straitjacket but to assist analysis by presenting succinctly the factors that the court must 
consider in making its decision and by articulating the relationship among the factors." 
American Hosp. Supply Corp. v Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) 
80 For a similar analysis, see Cavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34, at 78-79. 
81 United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also FTC v. HJ. 
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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is unlikely to substantially lessen competition, or by discrediting the 
data underlying the initial presumption in the government's favor. 82 
333 
As in any antitrust case, the difficult and controversial issue is setting 
the appropriate standard for proof and the burden of proof placed on 
the plaintiff.83 The consumer harm threshold, in principle, could be 
one of plausibility, tendency, significant likelihood, and so on, up to 
absolute certainty. 
Areeda and Hovenkamp also seem to contemplate a consumer welfare 
effect standard in RRC cases. They say that exclusionary conduct "requires 
actual or prospective consumer harm."84 They define (anticompetitive) 
exclusionary conduct as acts that: 
(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging, or prolonging 
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and 
(2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unneces-
sary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts produce or 
(2c) produce harms disproportionate to the resulting benefits.85 
Regarding the standard of proof, Areeda and Hovenkamp also observe 
that while "an expectation of consumer harm must always be at the 
logical end of any determination that a particular act 'monopolizes,' ... 
this is not the same thing as showing that consumer harm has in fact 
resulted from the challenged practice."86 Harm may "be threatened 
rather than realized."87 
1. The Section 2 Consumer Welfare Effect Standard in the Case Law 
A consumer welfare effect standard for evaluating the Section 2 liability 
flows directly from the Court's observation that antitrust is a "consumer 
welfare prescription. "88 Such a standard was adopted explicitly by the 
82 Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 992. 
83 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST LJ. 
693 (2000); David A. Balto & Ernest A. Nagata, Proof of Competitive Effects in Monopolization 
Cases: A Response to Professcrr Mum, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 309 (2000); Timothy J. Muris, 
Anticompetitive Effects in Monopolization Cases: Reply, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 325 (2000); see also 
Baker, supra note 24. 
84 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, 'II 651d, at 79. 
85 [d. 'II 651a, at 72. 
86 [d. 'II 651d, at 80. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise uses the example of arresting 
drunken drivers before they actually kill someone. [d. 
87 [d. 'II 651d, at 80. 
BS Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). Even this conclusion is not devoid 
of controversy, however. Compare Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper 
Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, Statement 
Presented to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, available at http://www.amc.gov/ 
public_studiesjr28902/exclus_conduccpdf/051104_Salop_Mergers.pdf; Charles F. (Rick) 
Rule, Consumer Welfare, Efficiencies, and Mergers, Statement Presented to the Antitrust 
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D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsojt,89 in which the court outlined a 
test requiring the plaintiff to prove that consumers would be harmed.90 
If that showing is made, then the monopolist may offer a procompetitive 
justification for its conduct.91 This justification then must be either invali-
dated by the plaintiff or the beneficial impact on consumers must be 
shown to be outweighed by the evidence of anticompetitive consumer 
harm.92 In this way, the likely effect on consumer welfare is predicted. 
The court, making the point that this standard is similar to the analysis 
that courts routinely carry out under the Section 1 rule of reason,93 
quoted the Supreme Court's seminal Standard Oil opinion, stating: 
[W]hen the second section [of the Shennan Act] is thus hannonized 
with ... the first, it becomes obvious that the criterion to be resorted 
to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations 
of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason guided by 
the established law.94 
Modernization Commission, available at http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/pdf/ 
Statement-Rule. pdf 
89 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In Microsoft, the 
court did little explicit balancing because there generally was nothing to balance. For some 
conduct, Microsoft lacked a cognizable procompetitive justification. For other conduct, the 
government failed to offer evidence that the consumer harm exceeded the benefits that 
the court attributed to the conduct. However, the court claimed to balance benefits and 
harms with respect to its analysis of Microsoft's licensing restriction. For that conduct, the 
court concluded that the prohibition on OEMs automatically launching a substitute user 
interface upon completion of the boot process was necessary to prevent a "substantial 
alteration" of Microsoft's copyrighted work and "outweighs the marginal anticompetitive 
effect" of the prohibition. Id. at 63. For certain other conduct, the court appeared to 
apply a non-balancing framework. For a discussion of this latter point, see Popofsky, New 
Frontier, supra note 15. 
90 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59. 
91Id. at 59. 
92Id. 
95 As stated by the court, "In cases arising under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts 
routinely apply a similar balancing approach under the rubric of the 'rule of reason.'" 
Id. at 59. In this regard, compare the D.C. Circuit's formulation in Microsoft to the Second 
Circuit's language on Section 1 in United States v. VISA USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d 
Cir. 2003) ("For the government to prevail in a rule of reason case under § 1, the district 
court concluded, and the parties do not argue otherwise, that the following must be 
shown: As an initial matter, the government must demonstrate that the defendant conspira-
tors have 'market power' in a particular market for goods or services. Next, the government 
must demonstrate that within the relevant market, the defendants' actions have had 
substantial adverse effect on competition, such as increases in price, or decreases in 
output or quality. Once that initial burden is met, the burden of production shifts to the 
defendants, who must provide a procompetitive justification for the challenged restraint. 
If the defendants do so, the government must prove either that the challenged restraint 
is not reasonably necessary to achieve the defendants' procompetitive justifications, or 
that those objectives may be achieved in a manner less restrictive of free competition.") 
See also Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 27, §§ 1.2, 3.37. 
94 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911». 
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Aspen Skiing95 also used language that suggests the use of consumer 
welfare effect as the overarching liability standard. First, the Court explic-
itly stated the relevance of "impact on consumers."96 Second, the jury 
instruction summation (affirmed by the Court) asked whether the defen-
dant's conduct was "designed primarily to further any domination of the 
relevant market or sub-market."97 This formulation admits the potential 
for multiple motives and the resulting need to compare evidence of 
opposing effects. Third, the Court asked whether the conduct "has 
impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way." 98 This formula-
tion is similar to the "reasonably necessary" language used in Section 1 
cases.99 Evaluating whether the exclusion is "unnecessarily restrictive" 
(or "unreasonably exclusionary") requires some method of comparing 
the evidence of conflicting motives and effects, which the consumer 
welfare effect standard provides. Applying this standard to the facts, the 
Court in Aspen Skiing also found that the comparison was not difficult. 
The jury concluded that Ski Co.'s conduct was not justified by "any 
normal business purpose."IOO 
This type of consumer-oriented competitive effect analysis also was 
embraced by the FTC in the 1980 du Pont decision regarding DuPont's 
expansion of its titanium dioxide production capacity. The FTC referred 
to its analysis as a "rule of reason-type approach," which suggests its 
relationship to Section 1 analysis.1ol As Commissioner Clanton opined, 
"we believe that there is no substitute for a careful, considered look at 
the overall competitive effect of the practices under scrutiny."lo2 How-
ever, the profit-sacrifice test also figured in the Commission's determina-
tion because complaint counsel argued that DuPont's conduct involved 
profit sacrifice, a claim that was rejected by the Commission. 
95 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
96 [d. at 605. 
97 [d. at 597 (emphasis added). 
98 [d. at 605. The Court cites the Areeda and Turner treatise, referring to conduct that 
not only impairs rivals, but also "either does not further competition on the merits or 
does so only in an unnecessarily restrictive way." [d. at 605 (citing 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & 
DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 78 (1978»; see also Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 
F.2d 843, 853 (6th Cir. 1979). The term "unnecessarily restrictive" suggests that the finn's 
procompetitive goal could have been achieved with conduct that would have permitted 
more competition. 
99 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115 (1984) (NCAA's television plan was not 
"necessary to enable the NCAA to penetrate the market" (emphasis added»; see also United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658,669 (3d Cir. 1993). 
100 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585, 608. 
101 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 1980 FTC LEXIS 14, at ~ 160 (1980). 
102 [d., 1980 LEXIS at ~ 201. 
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2. Applying the Consumer Welfare Effect Standard 
Antitrust law focuses on consumer welfare (in particular, preventing 
economic harm to purchasers from anticompetitive conduct), not the 
defendant's profits or the protection of competitors. Therefore, the 
consumer welfare effect standard is useful because it is a fact-based 
analysis of the competitive effect of the allegedly anticompetitive monop-
olizing conduct. 103 In most antitrust cases, the profit-sacrifice and con-
sumer welfare effect standards will reach the same outcome. However, 
there is no reason to think that the impact on the defendant's profits 
in the hypothetical world of the profit-sacrifice test would be a good proxy 
for the impact on consumers. Therefore, highlighting those situations in 
which the two standards are likely to diverge is critical to a comparative 
analysis. These obviously are the "harder cases." But only by looking at 
the harder cases can the standards properly be evaluated and compared. 
a. Inducing Refusals to Deal by Independent Input Suppliers 
In the example used previously to illustrate the profit-sacrifice test, it 
was assumed that a dominant firm is initially selling 500 units at a price 
of $60 per unit and earning profits of $5000. It also was assumed that 
if the firm's closest competitor is denied access to a critical input sold 
by a number of input suppliers, then the firm would be able to raise its 
price to $100 because the disadvantaged competitor would have the 
incentive to reduce its output and raise its own price. The alleged exclu-
sionary conduct involves exclusionary vertical agreements with the critical 
input suppliers to refuse to supply the competitor in exchange for fees 
of $3000 for refusal to deal agreements that lack any efficiency benefits 
(e.g., elimination of free riding). 
Based on these facts, this exclusionary conduct is anticompetitive and 
would violate the consumer welfare standard because it causes consumers 
to pay higher prices, with no offsetting consumer information or quality 
benefits that might occur if the conduct had eliminated free riding. 
Consumer welfare also would fall if there were modest benefits that were 
insufficient to reverse or offset the higher prices. 
There would be no liability, however, if consumers could turn easily 
to other competitors who continue to sell a homogeneous product at 
the initial $60 price. In this scenario, consumers would not be harmed 
103 For a general analysis of the application of the consumer welfare effect standard to 
specific RRC exclusionary conduct. see Krattenmaker & Salop. supra note 22. 
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by the agreements, despite the fact that the agreements harm competitors 
and lack any efficiency benefits. 104 
It might be argued that this scenario would be highly unexpected. 
First, the other unrestrained competitors might have the ability and 
incentive to raise their prices above $60 once some of their rivals are 
denied access to the critical input. But, that result does not follow as a 
matter of logic and is not always the case in practice. It depends on the 
number and excess capacity of the unrestrained competitors and their 
ability to successfully coordinate prices. 105 Second, it might seem that 
the defendant would lack an incentive to pay input suppliers to refuse 
to deal in this situation. But, as discussed in the earlier analysis of the 
profit-sacrifice standard, the defendant's profits nonetheless may 
increase because it is able to expand its sales at the $60 price. For 
example, if its sales would increase by 100 units and its profit margin 
were more than $30 per unit (as opposed to the $10 assumed in the 
hypothetical), these increased profits would exceed the $3000 paid to 
the input suppliers for the exclusion. 
b. Predatory Pricing 
In Brooke Group, the Court did not adopt an explicit consumer welfare 
effect standard, opting instead for its two-prong test of whether there 
was below-cost pricing and a dangerous probability of recoupment. lOG 
Predatory pricing delivers short-run benefits to consumers in the form 
of lower prices during the predatory period and, if the predation is 
successful, higher prices (and consumer welfare losses) during the 
recoupment period. If a court were to apply the consumer welfare effect 
test to predatory pricing, the defendant's strategy would violate the 
consumer harm standard only if the net present value of consumer 
welfare decreased from the conduct. That is, the court would evaluate 
whether the consumer benefits from lower prices achieved during the 
predatory period outweigh the likely harm during the recoupment 
period, taking into account the time value of money.107 Thus, the 
104 If the products were differentiated, then consumers would be harmed from the 
reduction in variety and consumer choice. This finding could form the basis for antitrust 
liability under the consumer welfare standard. However, it is not clear that a court would 
treat the reduction in variety and choice as sufficient for liability. For further discussion 
of this policy issue, see infra note 193. See also Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, 
Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Aptnvach, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 513, 548-49 (1995). 
105 For further analysis, see Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 2. 
106 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-23 
(1993). 
107 The Brooke Group recoupment test evaluates the likelihood that the predator would 
be able to raise price subsequently. This recoupment analysis could be used as part of the 
evaluation of the impact on consumers but the two calculations are not identical. 
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consumer welfare effect standard could be more or less permissive than 
either the Brooke Group or the profit-sacrifice standard, depending upon 
the exact facts. 108 
c. Incompatible Design Change 
As discussed earlier, if the profit-sacrifice standard were applied to an 
incompatible design change that is a necessary, inextricable feature of the 
performance improvement, that standard would compare the increase in 
product value to consumers from the design change to the defendant's 
increased cost of the improved product. 109 This increased value would 
be compared to the increased cost in order to gauge whether the firm's 
profits would increase in the hypothetical world. In the example, the 
increased value was $5 per unit. If the increased cost were $3 per unit, 
then the conduct would pass muster. It would be condemned under a 
profit-sacrifice test if the unit cost increase were $6. Thus, the profit-
sacrifice standard requires the court (or the firm) to quantify the value 
of the product improvement to consumers and compare that change in 
value to the increased cost of producing the improved product. 
Under the consumer welfare effect standard, the relevant antitrust 
question is whether the evidence better supports the view that the overall 
effect of the design change is procompetitive rather than anticompetitive, 
i.e., whether consumers are benefited or harmed. The court would focus 
on the quality-adjusted price. It would compare the increased value of 
the new product to the increased price paid by consumers, not to the 
increased cost borne by the defendant. 
This consumer effect analysis could find antitrust liability despite the 
fact that the conduct involves a product improvement because the 
improvement in the hypothetical is inextricably linked to the elimination 
of compatibility and the resulting diminution of competition. For exam-
ple, suppose the combination of the product improvement and incom-
patibility permits the dominant firm to raise its price for the new product 
by $50 but the increased value to consumers is only $5. ll0 On these facts, 
108 It could be more permissive because the strategy may not reduce the net present 
value of consumer welfare, even if there is below-cost pricing. It could be less permissive 
because it would not be necessary to show below-cost pricing. See Edlin, supra note 24. 
109 See supra Part II.B.2. Simply showing the new product is qualitatively better is not 
sufficient to escape liability because the price increase in the hypothetical benchmark world 
would be assumed to be equal to the increased value of the new product's performance. 
110 As discussed previously, if the incompatibility were not a reasonably necessary by-
product of the product improvement (for example, if a compatible version could be 
produced at the same cost, or if the older compatible version also still could be made 
available), then the incompatibility itself would be attacked. Absent the costly reduction 
in compatibility, consumers would have obtained the product improvement and continued 
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the quality-adjusted price clearly rises and consumer welfare is reduced 
because paying $50 extra for $5 worth of product improvements is a 
bad deal for the consumers who purchase the product. The product 
improvement is valued by consumers, but not by enough when it comes 
unavoidably bundled with increased barriers to competition that permit 
such large price increases. 
Of course, if the product improvements were large enough, the result 
would change. For example, suppose that the product improvements 
raised the performance value to consumers by $60 instead of $5. In that 
case, even paying $50 more for the product would reduce the quality-
adjusted price and raise consumer welfare, if the incompatibility and 
resulting exclusion of competitors are necessary to achieve the $60 
increase in value. 
This analysis has assumed that the ex post market outcome of the 
innovation was certain. However, in the real world, innovation often is 
an uncertain process. It is possible that at the time that the innovation 
was made, the innovator could not reasonably expect the innovation to 
allow it to raise price disproportionately to the consumer benefits. The 
fact that the new product turned out to be incompatible, and the fact 
that the rivals were unable to re-achieve compatibility, may have been a 
surprise. In those circumstances, a purely ex post analysis could lead to 
false positives. III Instead, the conduct would be evaluated from an ex 
ante perspective, based on the information reasonably available at the 
time that the innovator made its investment decision.1l2 
d. Cost-Reducing Investments 
A common concern about the consumer welfare effect standard is 
that it might be used to condemn a simple cost reduction by a firm with 
market power. To analyze this issue, consider the following example. 
Two firms are competing by selling differentiated products. The larger 
firm has variable costs of $20 per unit and the smaller firm has variable 
costs of $40. Because they produce differentiated products, their prices 
exceed their variable costs. Suppose that the low-cost firm charges $50 
and the high-cost firm charges $60. 113 Furthermore, assume the low-cost 
competition. The profit-sacrifice standard would lead to the same result in this scenario. 
This issue about the availability of the old product was raised in the Berkey case, though 
in that matter, Kodak continued to sell the old type of film. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 n.39. 
III It could lead to false negatives in situations where the price likely would rise but 
turned out not to increase. 
112 This issue is discussed in more detail below. See infra Part 11.0.3. 
113 The low-cost firm might be able to obtain a 100% market share by reducing its price 
significantly, but the example assumes that this would not be the profit-maximizing strategy. 
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firm has a much higher market share, say 85 percent, and that there are 
barriers that would prevent entry by any other competitors. 
Given these initial conditions, suppose that the low-cost firm has an 
opportunity to invest in a proprietary new lower-cost production technol-
ogy that would push its production costs down from $20 to $5. Assume 
the firm makes this capital investment and reduces its price to $30, at 
which point the smaller firm files a Section 2 complaint claiming that 
it is unable to match the lower production costs and will be forced to 
exit from the market. To focus on the differences between the standards, 
suppose that the smaller firm can establish that, once it exits, it would 
be unable to re-enter the market in the future, even if the larger firm 
subsequently raises its price. Il4 
If the smaller firm alleges that the larger firm's capital investment in 
the new, more efficient technology is an anticompetitive exclusionary 
investment (i.e., because the firm's investment that will raise the plain-
tiff's investment costs to a prohibitive level and cause it to exit from the 
market, allowing the larger firm to achieve a durable monopoly), how 
would this complaint be treated under the profit-sacrifice and consumer 
welfare effect tests? 
Some commentatorsIl5 and courtsIl6 might want to take the position 
that such cost-reducing investments should be permissible per se, regard-
less of their effect on consumers. But, the profit-sacrifice standard could 
be applied to this conduct, and the investment strategy could be con-
demned under the profit-sacrifice test, depending on the magnitude of 
the investment cost of the new technology. In particular, suppose that 
it was reasonably foreseeable by the firm that an adequate return on this 
investment cost only could be recovered by driving the rival out of 
business and raising price. In this case, the strategy would fail the profit-
sacrifice test (including the no economic sense version) because it would 
114 If the smaller firm alleges predatory pricing in its complaint, it would lose under 
Brooke Group because the larger firm is not pricing below its costs. 
115 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 34, at 316-20. In this case, the smaller firm was less 
efficient even before the larger firm's cost-reducing investment so that the equally efficient 
competitor standard also would not be violated. Werden would place such cost-reducing 
conduct in a safe harbor. Werden, supra note 10, at 419 n.25. 
116 For example, perhaps Judge Douglas Ginsburg had something like this in mind with 
his statement in Cuuad that if Bell Atlantic's deceptive advertising forced Covad to increase 
its own advertising in response, "competition was only enhanced." Covad Communications. 
Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, what seems peculiar 
about this statement is that the allegation involved deceptive advertising, not a simple cost 
reduction. Deceptive advertising directly harms consumers and potentially raises rivals' 
counter-advertising costs. Judge Ginsburg simply assumes away the possibility of anticom-
petitive effect. 
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be unprofitable on balance, absent the lessening of competition caused 
by the plaintiff's exit and the subsequent price rise. 1I7 
Under the consumer welfare effect standard, the plaintiff would need 
to prove that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff might exit 
rather than emulate the larger firm's investment strategy and reduce its 
own costs (which would have prevented price from rising and harming 
consumers). The plain tiff also would need to prove that consumers likely 
would be injured from the strategy. Even assuming that exit and the 
subsequent price increase was certain, consumer harm is not inevitable 
from the overall strategy, taking into account the consumer benefits 
achieved during the interim period when the market prices were lower. 
The consumer welfare effect standard is not a vague and open-ended 
balancing test but rather involves the calculation of the "average" price, 
taking into account the volume of sales at the different prices over time 
and the time value of money.llS Proving consumer harm would not 
be easy. 
Thus, it is not clear that the defendant has much to fear here from 
the consumer welfare effect standard. First, under the consumer welfare 
effect standard, the plaintiff would have the burden, not the defendant. 
It is not clear that the plaintiff would have the burden under the profit-
sacrifice test. 1I9 Second, it is not clear that the consumer welfare effect 
standard would be more restrictive than the profit-sacrifice standard in 
this case and may well be less restrictive. 
3. Applying the Consumer Welfare Effect Standard Ex Ante 
This example of cost-reducing investment raises an important point 
about the consumer welfare effect standard that may be misunderstood. 
In this type of case, the consumer welfare effect analysis generally would 
be an ex ante analysis, not an ex post analysis. That is, the court would 
evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of expected consumer benefits 
or harms based on the information reasonably available at the time that 
the conduct was undertaken. It would not simply examine the ultimate 
ex post market effect. This timing makes sense because any deterrence 
117 This test assumes that the benchmark for the profit-sacrifice evaluation uses the initial 
prices and quantities of both firms. As discussed below, another possible implementation 
of the profit-sacrifice test would use the initial prices as the price benchmark but allow 
the quantities to adjust to the new costs. This test is more permissive, but it still might be 
failed for a cost reduction if the higher price is also needed to achieve profitability. 
118 The plaintiff's task also would be made more difficult because the low prices are 
achieved in the present while the high prices occur in the future and because downward-
sloping demand curves mean that more units are sold at low prices than at high prices. 
119 The defendant may well be assigned the burden with the profit-sacrifice test because 
it controls the relevant evidence. See infra Part IV.D. 
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only could take place on the basis of ex ante information and because 
the defendant is not compensated by the judicial system when consumer 
welfare increases.120 Thus, a key issue would be what consumer effect 
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the investment. (Similarly, the 
profit sacrifice standard also would be carried out on an ex ante basis.121 ) 
This foreseeability analysis can be illustrated with the cost-reducing 
investment example. Suppose that, at the time that the investment was 
made, the firm understood that there were two possible market outcomes. 
In one scenario, the rival would achieve its own matching cost reductions 
through its own investments, in which case prices would fall and consum-
ers would benefit. In the other scenario, the rival would be unable to 
achieve any cost reductions and would exit the market, at which point 
prices would rise (say, permanently) to the monopoly level. It is clear 
that consumers would be better off if the defendant would undertake 
the investment in the first scenario where it would lead to lower prices 
ex post but would have forgone the investment in the second scenario 
where it would lead to higher prices ex post. 
Suppose that the firm reasonably could identify the applicable scenario 
before making the investment. In this case, the ex ante and ex post 
analysis would be identical. If the firm knew (or reasonably should have 
known) that the second market scenario would result and it made the 
investment, then the conduct would be condemned under the consumer 
welfare effect standard. The investment was harmful to consumers. 
However, in many cases, at the time the investment is made, the firm 
would not be able to identify which scenario actually would occur. It 
would be a matter of probabilities. In those cases, the consumer welfare 
effect would be evaluated on an ex ante basis, using those reasonable 
probabilities. The analysis would involve estimating the likely impact on 
prices and consumer welfare. The conduct would be condemned only 
if expected consumer harm were found or, stated differently, only if the 
likelihood and magnitude of the potential consumer harm (in the second 
scenario) outweighed the likelihood and magnitude of the potential 
consumer benefits (in the first scenario) .122 
120 See the numerical example infra note 141. 
121 Werden also points out that the no economic sense standard would be evaluated on 
the basis of what was reasonably foreseeable at the time that the conduct was undertaken. 
Werden, supra note 10, at 416; see also id. at 417 n.16 (noting that in Dentsply, the district 
court found that the defendant had undertaken conduct with the mistaken belief that it 
would have an exclusionary effect). 
122 For an example of this type of analysis in the context of mergers, see Heyer, supra 
note 63. This also is similar to the type of ex ante determination undertaken in preliminary 
injunction cases. For example, judge Posner suggests that the court should compare "the 
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This same ex an te focus of the consumer harm analysis would be used 
even if the case were brought after the fact, that is, after it became known 
that the second scenario actually occurred, perhaps as evidenced by the 
fact that the rival exited the market and prices rose. It would not make 
sense for a court to base liability solely on the actual ex post outcome 
if the defendant could not have known ex ante that this outcome was 
reasonably likely to occur. Because the goal of antitrust rules is to create 
optimal deterrence, the standard must be based on what the firm knew 
or should have known at the time that the conduct was undertaken. 123 
This ex ante standard has important implications for the evaluation of 
false positives and false negatives caused by the different standards.124 
III. EVALUATING THE PROFIT-SACRIFICE AND 
CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECT STANDARDS 
The fundamental question for antitrust is which standard provides a 
more accurate appraisal of the competitive effect of exclusionary con-
duct. A decision-theoretic approach to legal rules shows that the con-
sumer welfare standard for exclusionary conduct is subject to less error 
than the profit-sacrifice standard. And, any potential for "false positives" 
from the consumer welfare standard is better resolved by awarding close 
cases to the defendant than by making a qualitative change in the legal 
standard and requiring the plaintiff to show profit sacrifice. 
A. A DECISION-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANTITRUST LIABILITY STANDARDS 
Decision theory provides a framework for determining legal standards 
by analyzing the cost of legal errors and legal process costs.125 For 
probability of an erroneous denial weighted by the cost of denial to the plaintiff' with 
"the probability of an erroneous grant weighted by the cost of grant to the defendant." 
Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986). See also 
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v Philip Morris Inc, 60 F. Supp. 2d 502, 511 (M.D.N.C. 1999). 
123 Similarly, if the investment were found to cause likely consumer harm on the basis 
of the ex ante analysis, the defendant would not be excused because price did not rise 
ex post. Easterbrook and Werden suggest that firms should not be condemned for their 
mistakes. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, supra note 5, at 267 (observing that a failed 
attempt at predation "occasions no loss to consumers; a price reduction not leading to 
monopoly ... simply benefits consumers by saving them money."); Werden, supra note 
10, at 416 ("The test does not condemn conduct undertaken because of an unreasonable 
belief that the conduct would have an exclusionary effect."). However, in this case, the 
defendant did not make a mistake ex ante, but rather was just unlucky ex post. Of course, 
because the conduct failed ex post, such cases might better be pleaded as attempted 
monopolization rather than as monopolization. 
124 See infra Part III.A. 
125 Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule Making, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257 (1974); C. Frederick Beckner, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust 
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST LJ. 41 (1999); Heyer, supra note 63. 
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example, in the context of Section 1 claims, the long-held antitrust bias 
is that the likely consumer harm from erroneously permitting a successful 
price-fixing conspiracy (i.e., a "false negative") is far greater than the 
likely consumer harm from erroneously prohibiting joint price setting 
that has no anticompetitive effect (i.e., a "false positive"). This assump-
tion provides a rationale for the per se and quick-look rules that can 
eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs prove anticompetitive harm to 
consumers.126 
Decision-theoretic analysis also can be applied to the determination 
of Section 2 standards. 127 This analysis might involve a general Section 2 
standard, or different standards for specific categories of conduct.128 The 
Copperweld decision reflects the view that antitrust enforcers generally 
should be more skeptical of agreements (particularly agreements among 
competitors) than unilateral conduct. l29 Although a fear of false positives 
from constraining unilateral conduct (even by a monopolist) was used 
by the Court in Trinko as a general rationale for the profit-sacrifice test 
for exclusionary conduct, the analysis here suggests that this confidence 
in the profit-sacrifice standard over the consumer welfare effect standard 
is misplaced. 130 
126 For example, this is the basic approach taken in FTC v. Superiur Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). For a general analysis of antitrust short-cut rules in the context 
of decision theory, see Beckner & Salop, supra note 125. Decision theory can be used to 
rationalize rules of per se legality as well as per se illegality. 
127 For the application of the decision-theoretic approach to monopolization law, see 
Salop & Romaine, supra note 14; Cass & Hylton, supra note 5; Easterbrook, supra note 5; 
Gavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34; Heyer, supra note 63. 
128 For example, Mark Popofsky suggests how application of various legal tests for monop-
olization would be appropriate for different types of exclusionary conduct in light of 
differences in enforcement costs and the likelihood of false positives and false negatives. 
Popofsky, Antitrust Rules, supra note 15. 
129 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). Professor 
Gavil has suggested that the Capperweld distinction has been weakened over time by the 
courts' increased reliance on direct evidence of actual anticompetitive effect. Andrew I. 
Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing GaP Between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 68 
ANTITRUST LJ. 87, 102-04 (2000). 
130 The Trinko Court stated that "the cost of false positives counsels against an undue 
expansion of § 2 liability." Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004). The Trinko Court also said that Aspen Skiing is "at or near 
the outer boundary of § 2 liability," presumably because of a concern about false positives. 
fd. at 399. Aspen Skiing, however, also was at the outer boundary because the defendant's 
lawyers erred by failing to appeal the narrow geographic market definition. More impor-
tantly, the plaintiff wanted to fix prices with the defendant through the jointly priced 
weekly ticket. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 591 n.9 
(1985). But the Court apparently could not dispose of the case on these grounds because 
Ski Co. dropped the issue. fd. at 598 n.22. The Trinko Court did not even mention this 
aspect of the defendant's conduct. Instead, it focused solely on the fact that the defendant 
refused to sell daily tickets at the retail price to the plaintiff. That latter conduct is 
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In decision-theoretic terms, there are two kinds of erroneous decisions, 
ex ante errors and ex post errors. When a decision maker is forced to 
make decisions with imperfect information, some ex post errors are 
inevitable. The best the decision maker can do is to make the optimal 
decision in light of the limited information available. However, where 
this is not done, the decision maker commits an ex ante error. Suppose 
that the chance of rain is 99 percent and the decision maker chooses 
to carry an umbrella. If it turns out not to rain, that decision would be 
an ex post error. However, if the decision maker chooses not to carry 
an umbrella in this situation, that decision would be an ex ante error, 
even if it fortuitously does not rain. 
The profit-sacrifice standard allows both types of errors to be made. 131 
It permits conduct that causes ex post consumer harms. It also permits 
exclusionary conduct that causes ex ante consumer harms, i.e., conduct 
that reduces expected consumer welfare, taking into account the proba-
bility of benefits and harms. This general result is obvious because the 
direct impact on the defendant's profit is not equivalent to the overall 
impact of the conduct on consumer welfare, either ex ante or ex post. 
In fact, the profit-sacrifice test is not focused at all on the effect of the 
conduct on consumers. Rather, it is focused on the defendant's profits 
in a hypothetical world. These hypothetical profits are a highly imperfect 
(and generally biased) predictor of the impact of the conduct on competi-
tion and consumer welfare.132 
B. COMPARING THE INCIDENCE OF FALSE NEGATIVES 
AND FALSE POSITIVES 
The previous example of the incompatible design change illustrates 
how the profit-sacrifice test can lead to false negatives. Consider the 
simple situation discussed where the market outcome is highly predict-
able at the time that the conduct is undertaken and ex ante and ex post 
are identical. In that example, the price increase benchmark for the 
profit-sacrifice test would be $5 (i.e., the increase in product performance 
which would lead to a constant quality-adjusted price). If the design 
farther from the outer boundary because it prevented the plaintiff from competing, not 
from colluding. 
131 See Vickers, supra note 34, at F255; see also Edlin & Farrell, supra note 21, at 31 
("'sacrifice' ... is logically neither necessary nor sufficient for harm to competition. It 
could yet be a useful test, but only because of some (still unexplored) empirical correlation, 
not as a matter of economic logic."); Elhauge, supra note 34, at 271. 
132 The direction of the bias-false positive or false negative-depends on the type of 
conduct being evaluated, as discussed in the various examples. In addition, the standard 
systematically diverts attention away from the impact of exclusionary conduct on 
consumers. 
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change costs only $3 per unit, the defendant would not violate the profit-
sacrifice test. But, if that design change necessarily raises entry barriers 
by making competing products incompatible and that inextricably linked 
incompatibility would permit the firm to raise its price by $50, then 
consumers would be harmed because the quality-adjusted price would 
rise. If the profit-sacrifice standard were used, no sacrifice would be 
found despite this consumer harm. The result would be a false negative. 
Although the profit-sacrifice test is generally more prone to false nega-
tives, it sometimes can lead to false positives and condemn potentially 
exclusionary conduct that raises consumer welfare. The pure cost reduc-
tion hypothetical discussed earlier provides an example. 133 Consider first 
the simple version with perfect information, in which the impact on 
exit and price is known with certainty at the time the investment is 
undertaken. l34 As discussed in that example, it could well be that the 
firm would be able to recover its investment cost in a more efficient 
technology only if it were able to gain a monopoly market share and 
raise its price. If so, the investment would be condemned under the 
profit-sacrifice standard. However, that investment would pass muster 
under the consumer welfare effect standard, despite the higher ultimate 
prices, if market prices were sufficiently lower during the interim period 
before competitors exited from the market and the interim period were 
sufficien tly long.135 
133 See supra Part II.D.2.d; see also Elhauge, supra note 34, at 274-79; Marius Schwartz, 
Investments in Oligopoly: Welfare Effects and Tests for Predation, 41 OXFORD ECON • PAPERS 698, 
701 (1989). 
134 That is, it is reasonably foreseeable that the second scenario would result. 
135 In yet another example, suppose that a dominant firm undertakes an investment that 
reduces its variable costs by $5 per unit. Suppose further that the dominant firm realizes 
that its investment can and rapidly would be imitated by rivals, leading them to reduce 
their own costs by the same $5. As a result, the dominant firm decides that it cannot 
recover the cost of its investment and chooses not to undertake the investment. However, 
suppose that the dominant firm instead tweaks the technology slightly so that its investment 
breaks an industry standard, which in tum means that competitors can reduce their costs 
by only $3 per unit. As a result, the firm finds it necessary to reduce its price only by $3 
and, as a result, earns a sufficient return to justifY the investment. This conduct would 
escape liability under the consumer welfare test because prices fell. However, it might fail 
the profit-sacrifice test. The profit-sacrifice test might assume that the but-for benchmark 
involves the standard not being broken and the rivals' costs reduction not being con-
strained. It might be assumed that the hypothetical market price in this but-for world 
would decrease by $5, not $3. At this benchmark price decrease, the dominant firm 
investment would not be profitable and so would fail the profit-sacrifice test. If the profit-
sacrifice standard were implemented in this way, it would generate a false positive. Melamed, 
Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 17, criticizes this hypothetical as being unrealistic. 
He argues that the defendant also would bear some costs from the broken industry 
standard. However, having the defendant also bear a cost would not necessarily render 
the conduct unprofitable overall nor cause consumer harm on balance. He also suggests 
that the defendant would more likely use its cost advantage to drive the rivals out of 
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Some formulations of the profit-sacrifice test for Section 2 also would 
create false positives by condemning exclusionary conduct in markets 
in which the dominant firm is unable to gain sufficient market power 
to raise price.136 For example, suppose that a firm destroys the counter 
displays of one of its rivals and, as a result, profitably increases its market 
share. However, suppose that the defendant is unable to increase its 
price because of the existence of other competitors. Liability would 
not attach to this conduct under the consumer welfare effect standard 
because of the lack of any significant impact on price or consumer 
welfare.137 However, some implementations of the profit-sacrifice test 
would condemn this conduct. 
Proponents of the profit-sacrifice standard might concede these errors 
but still favor the profit-sacrifice test. They might argue that false positives 
are rare with the profit-sacrifice standard or would be eliminated by 
mandating a combined standard under which the plaintiff would be 
required to satisfy both the profit-sacrifice standard and the consumer 
welfare effect standard. 13s 
Profit-sacrifice proponents might not be concerned about false nega-
tives, arguing that the profit-sacrifice test is intended to trump direct 
evidence of anticompetitive effect in particular cases because the entire 
category of challenged exclusionary conduct ultimately benefits consum-
ers by creating more competition and better products. This criticism 
business, a conclusion that implicitly assumes that products are undifferentiated and that 
the firms have no capacity constraints. Finally, Melamed suggests that the defendant may 
have undertaken the innovation out of fear that someone else would move first, an 
assumption that is possible, but certainly is not compelled by any economic logic. For 
example, sometimes it is the idea that is original, not the implementation of the idea. 
Because ideas may not be patentable, the implementation can be rapidly imitated once 
the idea becomes known. 
136 For a similar point, see Creighton et aI., supra note 25. 
137 These false positives would be eliminated by the combined standard, but that approach 
raises the question of whether the profit-sacrifice prong adds any incremental value, in 
that it also causes false negatives. 
138 Several commentators use the profit-sacrifice test as a test of whether the conduct is 
"predatory." They then set out a structural analysis to gauge whether successful recoupment 
is likely, though this is not equivalent to a full consumer welfare analysis. See, e.g., Melamed, 
Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 11 n.19; Ordover & Willig, Predation, supra note 36, 
at 9-13. In a more recent article, Ordover and Willig add a third prong that analyzes the 
likelihood and sources of monopoly profits from exclusion. Ordover & Willig, Access and 
Bundling, supra note 34, at 109-10. In addition, they also require a showing of harm to 
competition. Id. at III n.7. Werden, supra note 10, at 417, states that the no economic 
sense test "is applied only after a demonstration that the challenged conduct actually has 
some tendency to eliminate or lessen competition." This suggests a two-part test with a type 
of anticompetitive market impact prong. However, Werden's use of the classic incipiency 
terminology of "tendency to eliminate or lessen competition" suggests a low bar for the 
plaintiff on its showing. 
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essentially makes a distinction between ex ante and ex post effect. The 
argument amounts to a claim that while consumers might gain ex post 
(i.e., in some cases) from the use of a consumer welfare effect standard, 
the use of the consumer welfare effect standard would generally over-
deter innovative conduct by dominant firms ex ante (i.e., on average). 
According to this view, there also is no way for courts accurately to 
balance the ex post and ex ante costs and benefits on a case-by-case 
basis. Instead, the profit-sacrifice test must be substituted or added to 
stop courts from intervening too often.139 
This criticism of the consumer welfare effect standard seems to assume 
erroneously that the effect analysis invariably would be based solely on 
(ex post) information that was unavailable at the time that the exclusion-
ary conduct was undertaken, rather than evaluated ex ante. That is not 
the case. l40 
If the court were to base its decision on the ex post outcome even 
when the defendant faced a high degree of uncertainty ex ante, then 
there could well be over-deterrence. Investments with a high likelihood 
of benefiting consumers, a low likelihood of harming consumers, and 
positive expected contribution to consumer welfare would be con-
demned in those situations when they happened to work out badly for 
consumers. As a result, investments with a positive expected contribution 
might be deterred, to the detriment of consumers. 141 However, this purely 
139 Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 27. 
140 In the cost-reducing investment example, if the firm could not reasonably have known 
at the time that the investment was made whether prices ultimately would rise or fall with 
a high degree of certainty, then the consumer welfare effect standard would evaluate the 
impact of the conduct on an ex ante basis, using the information available at the time 
the conduct was undertaken. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ~ 651b2, at 76; 
id. ~ 651d, at 81; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
141 The general potential for over-deterrence from an ex post evaluation of consumer 
welfare can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. Suppose that alleged exclusion-
ary conduct by a dominant firm is predicted ex ante to have a 50% chance of raising 
consumer welfare by 2000, if rivals match the firm's expenditures, which leads to prices 
falling or remaining the same. But, suppose that the conduct also has a 50% chance of 
harming consumers and reducing consumer welfare by 1000 from higher prices, if rivals 
are unable to match and instead are forced to reduce their output or exit. Suppose that, 
in the event that consumer welfare is raised, the defendant's profits would fall by 10, 
whereas if consumer welfare were reduced, the defendant's profits would rise by 100. 
Absent antitrust rules, the firm would engage in the conduct because the expected value 
of its profits is positive. Suppose, however, that the conduct is evaluated under the consumer 
welfare standard on an ex post basis in the event that consumers turn out to be harmed. 
Suppose further that in this case, the firm is assessed "single" damages equal to the 1000 
reduction in consumer welfare. Under this rule, the firm would be deterred from engaging 
in the conduct because its profits would fall by 10 if the conduct benefits consumers and 
its profits net of the damages would fall by 900 (i.e., 100 - 1000) if the conduct turns out 
to harm consumers. But this would represent over-deterrence because the conduct raises 
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ex post approach would be an improper implementation of the consumer 
welfare effect standard when there is a high degree of ex ante uncertainty. 
Implementing the consumer welfare effect standard on an ex ante 
basis may turn out to cause some ex post false positives or false negatives. 
Conduct that predictably leads to expected consumer benefits but un-
fortunately turns out to harm consumers ex post would not be con-
demned. 142 Similarly, conduct that predictably leads to expected 
consumer harms but fortuitously turns out not to harm consumers ex 
post would be condemned. The potential for these ex post errors must 
be tolerated for optimal ex ante deterrence when the outcome is 
probabilistic. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that this ex ante 
approach does not mean that any small likelihood of consumer benefit 
would permit the defendant to escape liability. In many cases, at the 
time that the exclusionary conduct is undertaken, the defendant does not 
face a significant uncertainty regarding the likely outcome: the consumer 
harm often is reasonably foreseeable and, indeed, may be the primary 
goal as well as the expected outcome of the exclusionary conduct. In 
such cases, the use of ex post analysis would be appropriate and would 
not cause false positives. In addition, the legal standard placed on the 
plaintiff for proof of consumer harm should not be excessive. In this 
regard, the consumer harm might be threatened rather than actually 
realized.143 
Critics of the consumer harm standard might argue that even this ex 
ante application of the consumer harm standard causes ex ante false 
positives and leads to over-deterrence because it is difficult to estimate 
the impact on consumer welfare, even on an expected value basis. l44 
Under these circumstances, it would be argued, the courts should err 
in the direction of false negatives because those errors are less serious. 
For example, Professor (now Judge) Frank Easterbrook argues that over-
the expected value of consumer welfare by 500. For this reason, the conduct properly 
would not be condemned in a ex ante evaluation. Note that this over-deterrence would 
not be mitigated by use of injunctive relief instead of damages. If the defendant is denied 
the opportunity to increase its profits, it will not institute the conduct. Incidentally, note 
that this conduct also would violate some versions of the profit-sacrifice test. Although 
the firm's expectation is that profits will rise (because the expected value of profits rises 
by 45), the conduct would be unprofitable absent the consumer harm from the higher 
prices in the event that rivals are unable to match. Because the expected value of consumer 
welfare rises, the profit-sacrifice standard would lead to over-deterrence, that is, a false 
positive. 
142 [d. 
143 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, '\I 651d, at 80. 
144 Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra note 11, at 380-81. 
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deterrence (resulting from false positives) is more serious than under-
deterrence (resulting from false negatives) because over-deterrence can 
slow innovation whereas false negatives will be self-corrected by mar-
ket entry.145 
However, this reasoning is inapplicable to modern antitrust enforce-
ment. Because entry can eliminate the harms from anticompetitive con-
duct, or even deter it, ease of entry routinely is taken into account 
in determining liability for monopolization. When entry is easy, the 
defendant properly would escape Section 2 liability under the consumer 
harm standard. Thus, there would be no false positives because there 
would be no liability. 
In contrast, if the liability standard itself is relaxed, the outcome will 
be harmful when there are entry barriers; the result will be a durable 
monopoly. When there are high entry barriers, a destroyed entrant likely 
cannot be resurrected or replaced. Thus, this analysis of entry barriers 
suggests that the profit-sacrifice standard leads to under-deterrence, not 
that the consumer harm standard leads to over-deterrence. 
As for innovation, anticompetitive exclusion likely would reduce inno-
vation in dynamic markets by eliminating rivals that would innovate and 
by decreasing competitive pressure that would force the monopolist to 
innovate. In fact, there is perhaps a greater irony in relying on Judge 
Easterbrook's advice. The entrant that is being destroyed, in fact, may 
be the very innovative firm trying to serve as the self-correcting market 
response to entry. Allowing exclusionary conduct reduces, or even elimi-
nates, the ability of the market to self-correct.l46 Moreover, there is no 
evidence that dominant firms' innovations have been deterred by the 
fear of antitrust. 147 
Judge Easterbrook also argues that false positives can set judicial prece-
dents that will not be undone. While that may have been true forty years 
ago, there have been major shifts in key antitrust precedents since then. 
There is no reason to think that plaintiff verdicts create stronger prece-
145 Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 3 (1984) [hereinafter 
Limits of Antitrust]. For a recent criticism of the view that markets are self-correcting, see 
David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1185 (2005). 
146 Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the 
Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 187, 197-98 (2000) [hereinafter First Principles]. See also 
Gavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34, at 37-38. Deterrence in this area also is 
reduced by the courts' unwillingness to use a strong remedy for the destruction of nascent 
competitors. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
147 Jonathan Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 2003, at 
27,41 [hereinafter Antitrust Enforcement]. 
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dents than do defense verdicts, either today or in the last twenty-five 
years since the use of per se rules outside of naked price fixing has 
declined. l48 And, broad precedents are unlikely in a case-by-case rule of 
reason analysis under Section 2. 
A different type of criticism involves judicial competence. Some anti-
trust experts argue that implementing the consumer welfare effect stan-
dard is beyond the competence of judges and juries.149 Judge Easterbrook 
also argues that courts cannot rely on economics because economists 
take a long time to decide and do not agree. 150 These criticisms seem 
extreme and unreliable. The rule of reason has been used in Section 1 
and Section 7 cases, so it is not clear why Section 2 would be so much 
harder. 151 
It certainly is ironic to hear now from Judge Easterbrook that econom-
ics is not useful. After all, the shock and dismay at the view expressed 
in Topco that courts should not "ramble through the wilds of economic 
theory" became a cause celebre for transforming antitrust standards from 
per se illegality to the rule of reason.152 Government agencies, courts, and 
juries also are asked to conceptualize and (if necessary) make quantitative 
comparisons in evaluating the costs and benefits of government pro-
grams, negligence under the classic Carroll Towing formula,153 whether 
a product design is defective,IM whether a preliminary i~unction should 
be granted,155 and whether an agency is providing sufficient due 
process.156 
Moreover, that same judicial competence argument would apply just 
as strongly to the implementation of the profit-sacrifice test, which 
148 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284 (1985); jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,45 (1984); Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Contintental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36 (1977). 
149 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 145, at 29. 
150 [d. at 11. 
151 For example, Baumol et al. suggest that a consumer welfare effect standard is the 
right criterion to use to evaluate false advertising claims with complicated market effects 
of the sort that would arise in an antitrust case. See William Baumol et aI., Brief of Amici 
Curiae Economics Professors to U.S. Supreme Court at 8, Verizon Communications Inc. 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (authored by four economics 
scholars: William]. Baumol,janusz A. Ordover, Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, and Robert 
D. Willig). 
152 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 n.l0 (1972); see also supra note 2, 
at 274-78. 
153 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
154 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. 573 P.2d 443 (1978). 
155 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prod. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986). 
156 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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requires a court to evaluate profitability in an unrealistic, hypothetical 
world. And, as discussed below, implementing the profit-sacrifice test is 
fraught with other pitfalls. 157 
Similarly, it is argued that the consumer welfare effect standard for 
exclusionary conduct would lead to firms facing too much uncertainty 
because it is so difficult to know whether conduct is anticompetitive.158 
This claim ignores the fact that the consumer welfare effect test would 
be evaluated on the basis of the information reasonably available to the 
firm at the time that the conduct was undertaken, just as would be true 
for the profit-sacrifice test. The profit-sacrifice test is not any easier for 
firms to administer, as illustrated by several of the examples presented 
earlier. The profit-sacrifice test (and the no economic sense variation) 
involve analysis of outcomes in a hypothetical world in which real-world 
market forces are assumed to be inoperative. 
For all these reasons, the consumer welfare effect standard is unlikely 
to lead to excessive false positives when it is used to evaluate exclusionary 
conduct. It also is not true that the profit-sacrifice standard would elimi-
nate false positives or would maintain a low level of false negatives. Nor 
is it clear why false positives are more costly or more difficult to reverse 
than false negatives in the current legal environment. Thus, in terms of 
optimal deterrence, there is no evidence supporting the view that the 
consumer welfare effect standard would lead to over-deterrence, nor 
that the profit-sacrifice standard would avoid under-deterrence. There 
is no convincing empirical evidence to suggest that the profit-sacrifice 
test reaches the optimal outcome, or even pushes in the right direction, 
in the current legal environment.159 
157 See infra Part IV. 
158 See infra Part IV.D. 
159 Empirical work to estimate the optimal standard would be very difficult. It is well 
known that the selection of cases that go to litigation is not a random sample of disputes, 
and the sample of cases that reach the Supreme Court is quite small, as well as non-
random. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). Econometrics, in principle, could be useful in demonstrating 
the superiority or inferiority of per se illegality versus per se legality. But it is far less likely 
to be useful in comparing the relative efficacy of alternative rule of reason standards. For 
example, suppose that an econometric study would find that the "average" vertical merger 
is procompetitive and leads to lower prices, as discussed in James C. Cooper et aI., Vertical 
Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference (Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper 
No. 05-12, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=699601. Such a rigorous study 
would be useful for arguing that vertical mergers should not be per se illegal. But, that study 
would not establish that all (or even that, say, 80% of) vertical mergers are procompetitive. 
Antitrust enforcement is designed to identify, enjoin, and deter only those few vertical 
mergers that are shown by the evidence to be anticompetitive. Thus, the results of a broad-
based empirical study are not very useful for guiding case-by-case enforcement. Nor would 
these results be useful in choosing between the consumer welfare effect and profit-sacrifice 
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Finally, if over-deterrence still is viewed as a concern, there are better 
ways of tipping the scales to avoid false positives. In particular, it would 
be better to adjust the plaintiff's standard of proof under the consumer 
welfare effect standard. However this adjustment is phrased by the courts, 
the amount of harm that would be needed for the plaintiff to prevail 
can be increased. For example, the consumer harm threshold, in princi-
ple, can be set at either actual or threatened harm. Similarly, the required 
standard of proof can be set at plausibility, tendency, substantially threat-
ened, significant likelihood, and so on, up to virtual certainty of signifi-
cant harm. The consumer welfare effect standard can be adjusted at 
the margin along this continuum to accommodate concerns about the 
relative costs of false positives and false negatives. This corresponds to 
the weighting of the evidence according to a sliding scale. l60 
On the one hand, if there is a greater concern with false positives, 
courts could be generally more skeptical of the plaintiff's allegations 
and evidence, both for summary judgment and in the merits determina-
tion. This would mean that defendants would prevail in close cases. (In 
fact, this may already be the case. 161 ) If an even greater adjustment were 
desired, the test could be phrased in the way Areeda and Hovenkamp 
put it, "harms disproportionate to the resulting benefits." 162 On the other 
hand, if there is a greater concern with false negatives, on the grounds 
that monopoly tends to be durable in markets with high entry barriers 
standards. For a similar view, see Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical 
Integration (2005) (unpublished manuscript). For a review of the large number of empiri-
cal studies of antitrust enforcement, see Jonathan Baker, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 
147. For criticisms of the FTC study, see William Coman or et aI., Vertical Antitrust Policy 
as a Problem of Inference: The Response of the American Antitrust Institute (AAI Working Paper 
No. 05-04, Apr. 2005), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/ 408.pdf. For 
further back-and-forth between the FTC and AAI authors, see the links at http://www.anti 
trustinstitute.org/recent2/413.cfm. 
160 See Salop & Romaine, supra note 14. 
161 The "preponderance of the evidence" standard is often expressed as requiring the 
plaintiff to show that the harm is more likely than not (i.e., 51 % likelihood). However, 
surveys of judges suggest that the required likelihood is larger than this for many judges. 
See C.MA McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293, 1330-32 (1982); see also Rita James Simon, Judges' 
Translations of Burden of Proof into Statements of Probability, 13 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 103, 
112 (1969). 
162 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ~ 651a, at 72. In evidentiary terms, the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof alternatively could be replaced by an 
even more disproportionate test like "clear showing" or something in between these two 
standards. For example, the FTC has recently suggested a move in the other direction-
that the burden placed on firms attempting to overturn the presumption of patent validity 
should be reduced from a standard of clear and convincing evidence to preponderance 
of the evidence. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAw AND POLICY 8 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm. 
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or because monopolists have ample opportunities to destroy nascent 
competitors without facing risk of a significant remedy, then the standard 
of proof facing the plaintiff could be relaxed accordingly. 
These various types of marginal quantitative adjustments make more 
economic sense than changing the liability standard in a qualitative way 
by adopting a standard, such as the profit-sacrifice test, that does not 
relate directly to the effect on consumer welfare. It is better to adjust 
the standard of proof than to make a wholesale change to the liability 
test that is not calibrated to the relative costs of the two types of judicial 
errors. When a qualitative change in the liability standard is adopted, 
there is no way of knowing whether the adjustment is the proper size. 
Simply grasping for a more defendant-friendly standard is just a shot in 
the dark. 
An explicit marginal or incremental adjustment to the basic anticom-
petitive effect standard also is more transparent than a qualitative change 
in standard. Such transparency is necessary to ensure that antitrust law 
remains coherent. Doctrinal incoherence is always a risk when adjust-
ments are made by adopting different qualitative standards. Litigants 
are left to argue by analogy over characterization (e.g., are loyalty pay-
ments more like alleged predatory pricing or more like attempts to 
induce exclusive dealing or more like tying), rather than arguing over 
the fundamental economic issue-the likely effect of the conduct on 
competition and consumers. It is hard to see how the goals of antitrust 
law are served by promoting analogy over analysis in this way. 
C. ANTI COMPETITIVE PURPOSE AND INTENT 
It might be argued that the plaintiff should be required to prove 
both profit sacrifice and consumer welfare harm. This type of combined 
standard could be claimed to flow from the concept of anticompetitive 
purpose and intent. For example, the combined standard could be said 
to follow from the classic Grinnell standard, which involves the "willful" 
acquisition of monopoly,163 although in Griffith, the Supreme Court said 
that specific intent is not required for monopolization. l64 Colgate also 
raises the issue of anti competitive purpose separate from anticompetitive 
effect. 165 In the combined standard, the profit-sacrifice standard would 
163 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,570-71 (1966). 
164 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, lO5 (1948). 
165 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919). Interestingly, in quoting 
Colgate, the Trinko Court dropped the "in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain 
a monopoly" proviso. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) ("Thus, as a general matter, the Sherman Act 'does not 
restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely 
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be treated as one source of evidence of anticompetitive purpose or the 
sole permissible evidence. The consumer welfare effect standard then 
would be used to determine whether there was an anticompetitive effect 
from the conduct. 
The role of anticompetitive intent in exclusionary conduct cases has 
been subject to substantial criticism. Areeda and Hovenkamp say that 
most discussion of "'purpose or intent' is largely diversionary or redun-
dant."I66 They do agree, however, that "knowledge of intent may help 
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences," that is, to 
evaluate whether there is anticompetitive effect. 167 In fact, for ambiguous 
conduct, they suggest that "considerations of subjective intent are some-
times essential."l68 
Similarly, the Microsoft court emphasized that the key antitrust issue 
is competitive effect, though that may give a role to intent, stating: "[ 0] ur 
focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it. 
Evidence of the intent behind the conduct is relevant only to the extent 
that it helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist's 
conduct." 169 
If a firm's exclusionary conduct would be unprofitable absent an anti-
competitive impact on price and output, then that profit sacrifice would 
imply that a profit-maximizing firm would not have undertaken the 
conduct absent the anticompetitive effect because it would make no 
rational economic sense for a profit-maximizing firm.170 However, there 
also are other ways to determine anticompetitive purpose. First, anticom-
petitive purpose could be inferred from anticompetitive effect, following 
Judge Hand's view that "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of 
what he is doing."171 This approach would dispense with the need for 
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom 
he will deal.'" (quoting Colgate, 250 u.s. at 307». 
166 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ~ 651, at 75. 
167 Id. at 74 (quoting Chicago Board of Trade v. United States 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918». 
168 Id. ~ 651 b2, at 76. For another recent discussion of the role of intent evidence, see 
Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role Icrr Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. 
REv. 151 (2004) 
169 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
170 In the context of predatory innovation (like the design change hypothetical in this 
article), Ordover and Willig state that profit-sacrifice shows that the innovation is "motivated 
solely by the monopoly attendant on the exit that they induce.» Ordover & Willig, Predation, 
supra note 36, at 8. Werden eschews an anticompetitive purpose interpretation of the no 
economic sense formulation. Werden, supra note 10, at 416-17, 417 n.15, 426. 
171 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (1945). Werden makes a 
similar point. "Burning down a rival's factory is exclusionary conduct even if the defendant 
is a pyromaniac and never considers the economic benefits of the conduct." Werden, 
supra note 10, at 417. 
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separate evidence. Second, anticompetitive purpose could be deter-
mined through testimony and documents. 172 
Moreover, conduct that does not involve profit sacrifice nonetheless 
may involve anticompetitive purpose and may cause anticompetitive 
effect. It is not possible to reject a claim of anticompetitive purpose in 
the absence of profit sacrifice for a simple reason: exclusionary conduct 
may have multiple motives rather than a single purpose. I73 
Werden eschews any interest in subjective motivation. But a complexity 
similar to multiple motives arises in his test when the conduct generates 
"legitimate" profits as well as "profits from eliminating competition." 
Werden suggests that the no economic sense determination may not be 
feasible in this situation.174 
When there are multiple motives, the profit-sacrifice test tends to 
ascribe the conduct to the procompetitive motive. In essence, the profit-
sacrifice test implicitly takes the approach that a defendant only can be 
said to be motivated by an anticompetitive purpose if the conduct would 
have been unprofitable (and thus not undertaken) in the absence of 
the claimed anticompetitive benefits to the firm. However, this view is 
not compelled by logic or economic theory.175 The anticompetitive effect 
of the conduct may have provided a sufficient incentive to carry out the 
conduct even absent any efficiency benefits. Applying this same logic 
symmetrically, it would be equally true to say that a defendant only could 
be said to be motivated by a procompetitive purpose if the conduct would 
have been unprofitable (and thus not undertaken) in the absence of 
the claimed efficiency benefits. 
Requiring that the plaintiff prove that the sole purpose of the conduct 
is anticompetitive would lead to significant false negatives, as pointed 
172 In Baumol et aI., supra note 151, at 24, Ordover and Willig and their co-authors 
recognize that there can be "direct objective evidence of willfulness, quite apart of profit 
sacrifice." They argue that this evidence should be used, but apparently only where the 
exclusionary conduct violates an extrinsic standard. 
173 It surely is fallacious to assume that all anticompetitive economic conduct is driven 
simply by strict profit maximization. Humans are motivated by emotions in addition to 
greed. Vanity, envy, hate, disdain, and spite also may motivate anticompetitive conduct, 
and the market for corporate control is not a perfect constraint on such non-profit-
maximizing conduct. In Werden's view, the defendant's psychological state is irrelevant. 
He would look to the "objective economic considerations for a reasonable person, and 
not the state of mind of any particular decision maker." Werden, supra note 10, at 416. 
174 Werden, supra note 10, at 420-2l. 
175 The profit-sacrifice standard does not go as far as immunizing all conduct with any 
non-zero efficiency benefits, as illustrated by the case of cost-reducing investments discussed 
earlier, in Part II.D.2.d. 
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out by Judge Hand in Alcoa. I76 Moreover, this pro-defendant approach 
to anticompetitive purpose is not the only possible way to deal with the 
concept. For example, in Aspen Skiing, the jury was instructed to deter-
mine whether the defendant's policies and business arrangements "were 
designed primarily to further any domination of the market or sub-
market." 177 The Court affirmed this instruction in the con text of analyzing 
the likely impact of the conduct on competition and consumer welfare. 
Of course, in that case, the Court also concluded that certain aspects of 
the defendant's conduct indicated profit sacrifice. 
This analysis of anticompetitive purpose also is related to the issue of 
so-called costless or cheap exclusion that might not violate the profit-
sacrifice test. The usual examples are fraud on the Patent Office, sham 
litigation, and bad-faith administrative filings. I78 For example, it is doubt-
ful that Unocal increased its own costs by failing to disclose its patent 
application to the regulators in California. I79 Similarly, it does not seem 
very costly for a monopolist to make threats or include deceptive state-
ments in its advertising. Exclusionary conduct that affects customers' 
expectations of the viability of the rivals also could be virtually "cost-
less" exclusion. ISO 
IV. PITFALLS IN THE PROFIT-SACRIFICE STANDARD 
In a recent article, Professor Mark Patterson concludes that the profit-
sacrifice test permits an "objective assessment" of the monopolist's 
176 In Alcoa, Judge Hand rejected the "sole purpose" version of the profit·sacrifice stan-
dard, stating that, "Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as limited to maneuvers not 
honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such a 
course indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.'" In Judge Hand's view, this 
standard would fail to protect competition, but rather "would in our judgment emasculate 
the Act; would permit just such consolidations as it was designed to prevent." United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431(2d Cir. 1945). 
177 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985) (empha-
sis added). 
178 Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at n.2. 
179 Union Oil Co. of Cal., FTC Docket No. 9305 (July 6, 2004), available at 2004 WL 
1632816; see also Creighton et aI., supra note 25. 
180 A slight variation of the allegations in Lorain Journal illustrates this point. Lorain 
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). Suppose that a monopolist newspaper 
is facing a new entrant in the advertising market and the newspaper announces that it 
will charge a price above the monopoly level if advertisers do not advertise exclusively in 
the newspaper. In light of this exclusivity policy, many (if not all) advertisers may choose 
to forgo buying advertising from the entrant, even if the entrant offers a large enough 
discount to offset the newspaper's "tax" on non-exclusivity and even if they think that 
successful entry would force the newspaper to abandon the exclusivity policy. This is 
because many (if not all) customers might fear that other advertisers would choose not 
to buy from the entrant, causing the entrant to fail to achieve minimum viable scale and 
thus be forced to exit from the market. For further analysis, see Eric B. Rasmusen et aI., 
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conduct, in contrast to other monopolization tests that "require hypothet-
ical reconstructions of the market in the absence of the monopolist'S 
challenged conduct or difficult causation inquiries."181 This analysis is 
flawed. Proper implementation of the profit-sacrifice standard is complex 
and would lead to subjectivity in practice precisely because the profit-
sacrifice test requires the court to determine the outcome in a hypotheti-
cal market. The hypothetical market of the profit-sacrifice test is not 
simply the actual market before the challenged conduct was initiated. 
The outcome in this hypothetical market also is not the same as the 
outcome in the real-world market absent the challenged conduct. 
Instead, the profit-sacrifice standard requires an assessment of the defen-
dant's likely conduct in the hypothetical absence of an ability to raise 
prices. In contrast, the consumer welfare effect standard looks to the 
effect of the conduct on the market outcome in the actual market or in 
a hypothetical (but normally functioning) market absent the conduct. 
The profit-sacrifice test is an unreliable legal standard because it is 
difficult to implement properly. Specific problems arise in several ways: 
analyzing situations where recoupment and predatory periods are simul-
taneous, choosing the correct benchmark price and quantity, and gather-
ing adequate information to use the profit-sacrifice test. These pitfalls 
can cause either false negatives or false positives. 182 
A. SIMULTANEOUS RECOUPMENT AND THE MEASUREMENT OF PROFIT 
In a successful predatory pricing scenario there typically are two dis-
tinct phases, the "predatory" period in which the firm reduces price 
(and, in doing so, sacrifices profits) and the "recoupment" period in 
which the firm increases price and market share, more than offsetting 
the profit sacrifice. 183 However, in RRC exclusionary conduct cases, such 
as purchases of exclusionary rights from input suppliers and refusals to 
deal, there often are not two distinct periods. Recoupment in the form 
of higher prices and market share can occur simultaneously with the 
exclusionary conduct. 184 If there is no distinct period in which temporal 
profit sacrifice can be identified, use of the profit-sacrifice test could 
Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1137 (1991); llya Segal & Michael Whinston, Naked 
Exclusion: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 296 (2000); see also Salop & Romaine, supra note 
14; Elhauge, supra note 34. 
181 Patterson, supra note 34, at 37, 43. 
182 Some of these pitfalls do not apply to the no economic sense formulation. 
183 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993). A type of simultaneous recoupment actually was alleged in Brooke Group. For a 
critical discussion of those claims, see Elzinga & Mills, supra note 62, at 569-70, 575-76. 
184 See Salop & Scheffman, supra note 22, at 267; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22, 
at 224; see also Elhauge, supra note 34, at 282-92. 
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lead to false negatives by failing to identify significant competitive injury. 
In contrast, the consumer welfare effect test would account for simultane-
ity by evaluating the impact on prices and consumer welfare in every 
period. 
This simultaneity represents a pitfall for the profit-sacrifice standard 
but one that can be corrected because there is a conceptual profit sacrifice 
even if there is no temporal profit sacrifice. The direct eJfect of the exclusion-
ary conduct can involve profit sacrifice, meaning that the language of 
profit sacrifice still can be used to describe the conduct. In principle, 
an analyst or a court could find other evidence to substitute for the 
temporal comparison of profits. I85 And, in fact, the no economic sense 
variation avoids this pitfall. I86 
B. MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE AND THE BENCHMARK PRICE 
In monopoly maintenance cases, the dominant firm does not use 
exclusionary conduct literally to raise its profits. Instead, it maintains its 
profits at the supracompetitive level and avoids profit reductions, for 
example, by preventing price competition. As a result, successful exclu-
sionary conduct would not be accompanied by any temporal increase in 
overall profits nor any temporal increase in price. This fact alone could 
lead a court to the erroneous conclusion that the firm has not engaged 
in profit sacrifice, thus running the risk of significant false negatives or 
under-deterrence. 
Monopoly maintenance cases also involve a knotty problem of selecting 
the but-for price benchmark for implementing the profit-sacrifice test. 
This is because the proper benchmark is not the current price, which 
is set at the monopoly level and generates the monopoly profits that the 
monopolist is trying to protect. This is a variant of the classic Cellophane 
Fallacy error made by the Court in du Pont,I87 probably the most well-
185 For example, in Aspen Skiing, the Court looked to Ski Co.'s conduct in other markets 
where it apparently lacked any purpose to destroy competition. The Court also reasoned 
from first principles that the failure to sell daily tickets to Highlands at its standard retail 
price represented a clear profit sacrifice. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603-04, 603 n.30 (1985). However, as discussed below, this analysis 
potentially ignores the higher profits that the defendant would have made in additional 
weekly tickets at the non-exclusionary price, or it characterizes those profits as anticompeti-
tive as a matter of assumption. 
186 Werden, supra note 10, at 424-25. The no economic sense variation avoids this pitfall 
because it does not focus on the profit chronology. 
187 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S 377 (1956). For the classic 
statement of the Cellophane Fallacy, see Donald Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane 
Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1956). See also Salop, First Principles, supra note 146, at 196; 
Elhauge, supra note 34, at 286. 
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known example of a false negative. The proper competitive benchmark 
for the profit-sacrifice test is the market price that would occur absent 
the alleged exclusionary conduct. 
This benchmark error is illustrated by extending the previous example 
of inducing refusals to deal by input suppliers. When the conduct was 
used to achieve monopoly power, there was profit sacrifice. 188 Transform-
ing this case into the context of monopoly maintenance results in a 
finding of no profit sacrifice if the initial monopoly price is set as the 
benchmark. For example, suppose that a firm initially is a monopolist 
selling 600 units at a price of $100 when it faces a threat of new entry. 
The firm anticipates that successful entry would cause the price to fall 
to a more competitive level of $60 and reduce its sales volume down to 
500 units. The firm also realizes that it is able to prevent this entry by 
paying $3000 to the suppliers of a critical input to refuse to deal with 
the entrant. 
In this example, if profit sacrifice is calculated by using the $60, post-
entry price as the price benchmark, then profit sacrifice would be found. 
This is the correct answer. The $60 price is the proper benchmark 
because the market price would be $60 absent the exclusionary con-
duct. 189 However, a court could err and instead use the $100 monopoly 
price as the benchmark. 
Such "grandfathering" of the monopoly profits mistakenly equates 
legitimately achieved monopoly power with permission to engage in 
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct to maintain the monopoly. The 
fact that the firm achieved the monopoly through superior skill, foresight, 
and industry does not give the firm a right to maintain that monopoly 
by exclusionary conduct in the face of entry. But, applying the profit-
sacrifice test with the monopoly price as the benchmark would do just 
that. As a result, the profit-sacrifice test can yield a false negative. 
This error would be less likely under the no economic sense version 
of the test in which the benchmark is intended to be the no-exclusion 
price, not the current monopoly price. However, even with that formula-
tion, a court could erroneously evaluate the economic rationality of the 
conduct at current prices, without respect to the potential downward 
price impact of forgoing the conduct. 
188 See supra Part II.B.l. 
189 Melamed seems to agree with this analysis. Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra note 
11, at 399 ("sacrifice test requires determination of what the price would have been if 
rivals' costs had not been increased"). 
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These errors in the monopoly maintenance case would not be made 
with the consumer welfare effect standard because it focuses on identify-
ing the market price that would occur in the market absent the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. If that price is lower than the current price, 
then the anticompetitive nature of the conduct would be seen. If the 
conduct also led to a product improvement or induced beneficial ser-
vices, those consumer benefits could be compared to the price effect to 
evaluate the net impact on the quality-adjusted price. 
C. THE COMPLEXITY OF DEFINING THE BENCHMARK OUTPUT 
The choice of the benchmark output for the profit-sacrifice standard 
also is subject to controversy. The defendant's benchmark output could 
be assumed to remain constant at the pre-exclusion level. Or, the bench-
mark output could be the output that the defendant would sell after the 
RRC conduct but assuming that the market prices did not change and 
the disadvantaged rivals remained viable. 
The general definition of the standard does not resolve this contro-
versy. As stated by Werden, "Applying the no economic sense test also 
may require sorting the profit gains from challenged conduct into a 
component attributable to legitimate competition on the merits and 
a component attributable to the elimination of competition."I90 This 
methodology requires the analyst to specify the meaning of "elimination 
of competition" and whether that includes conduct that harms competi-
tors but not competition (i.e., consumers). Thus, if the conduct does 
not permit the defendant to raise (or maintain) price, but does permit 
it to take output from a competitor, should that additional output be 
counted as legitimate or not? 
For example, consider RRC conduct in which a firm pays input suppli-
ers to refuse to deal with a competitor selling a differentiated product 
in a market with prohibitive entry barriers facing others. Suppose that 
this conduct raises the disadvantaged competitor's marginal costs. This 
exclusionary conduct would permit the defendant to raise price, which 
would harm consumers, assuming that the conduct does not significantly 
eliminate free riding or contribute significantly to efficiency in some way. 
Suppose that the profit-sacrifice standard were to specify a benchmark 
in which the victim's costs are raised, but the hypothetical market price 
remains constant at the pre-exclusion level and the defendant's output is 
190 Werden, supra note 10, at 420-21. See also supra text accompanying note 174. 
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assumed to remain constant. 191 Under this benchmark, the RRC conduct 
would violate the test. However, if the benchmark output is assumed to 
be the output level of the defendant after the RRC conduct, but at the 
benchmark price and assuming that the entrant remains viable, then 
this output would be higher and the RRC conduct may not be found to 
involve profit-sacrifice.192 
This divergence in outcome also is not correlated with whether or not 
there is consumer harm. If the defendant gains no power to raise price, 
for example, because there is sufficient competition from other non-
excluded competitors, the conduct can still fail the profit-sacrifice test 
when output is held constant.193 Modest efficiency benefits (e.g., cost 
savings) from the conduct would not necessarily change these results. 194 
191 Werden adopts this benchmark when it is found that "the defendant diverted the 
sales by directly impeding the ability of rivals to make those sales." [d. at 421. Werden 
views this situation as a rare case. 
192 The product design hypothetical also can illustrate this point. The profit-sacrifice 
test would assume that the quality-adjusted price remains constant. At that higher price, 
the firm might increase its profits by increasing its output and market share. Thus, even 
if the cost of the design change exceeds the increase in product value, the firm's profits 
still might rise. As a result, its conduct might not violate the profit-sacrifice test even 
though the unit cost of the design change exceeds its per unit incremental value. For 
example, suppose that the cost of the new higher-quality product is $6 per unit and the 
consumer value of the product improvement (and the benchmark price increase for the 
profit-sacrifice test) is $5. However, even when the price rises by $5, suppose that the 
dominant firm is able to increase its sales volume from 100 to 140 units because rivals are 
disadvantaged. If the monopolist's initial profit margin were $10 and that margin fell to 
$9 after the design change, the additional 40 units would increase the firm's profits by 
$360 (i.e., $9 x 40 units). This would more than offset the $100 decrease in profits from 
the $1 margin reduction on the 100 initial units, so the firm's profits would rise on balance 
by $260 (i.e., $360 - $100), not fall by $100. This is a case in which the conduct generates 
both "legitimate" and anticompetitive profits, so it is not clear that Werden would view 
the no economic sense test as "feasible." Werden, supra note 10, at 420-21. 
19S In this case, there is raising rivals' costs but no increased market power. Under the 
two-step market power harm analysis set out in Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22, this 
conduct would not violate the antitrust laws. The only consumer harm would be the small 
reduction in variety or perhaps an insignificant price increase. The usual focus of consumer 
injury in antitrust is the harm from higher prices, not simply the reduction in choice. If 
reduction in choice were sufficient without more to support an antitrust violation, then 
a horizontal merger of differentiated product suppliers would be anticompetitive if a 
single brand were eliminated. Closing a supermarket that is convenient to a nearby apart-
ment building would be sufficient for a finding a liability in a supermarket merger. Vertical 
mergers similarly would be more prone to challenge. See generally Riordan & Salop, supra 
note 104. 
194 For example, consider a firm's investment in a variable cost reduction. Holding the 
benchmark price constant at the level before the cost reduction, suppose that the firm 
cannot recover its investment costs without increasing its output at the expense of its 
competitors. On the one hand, if the profit-sacrifice test treats the benchmark output as 
fixed at the pre-exclusion level, then this cost-reducing conduct would be condemned by 
the profit-sacrifice test. On the other hand, the conduct would not be condemned if the 
profits on the defendant's increased output are counted as legitimate. 
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Alternatively, if the conduct would lead to higher prices in the real world, 
the conduct could pass the profit-sacrifice test when the benchmark 
output is set at the higher level, even if there are no efficiency benefits 
and the exclusion is costly to the defendant. Thus, whichever output 
benchmark is chosen will lead to problematic results in some cases. 195 
Of course, choosing the output benchmark on the basis of an extrinsic 
conclusion of whether or not the conduct is considered "competition 
on the merits" is circular, as discussed previously.196 It is the role of the 
standard to define competition on the merits, not the other way around. 
The choice of assumption for the benchmark output also would create 
a controversy between the opposing economic experts and would add 
another level of complexity into the profit-sacrifice test. If these disagree-
ments could be resolved, this source of subjectivity would be eliminated, 
but resolution is unlikely. This is because the profit-sacrifice standard 
has a number of alternative formulations and exclusionary conduct is 
diverse, which makes resolution a long and arduous process. Rather than 
embark on this process and the likely errors attendant to it, a better 
approach would be to adopt the consumer welfare effect standard. 
D. INFORMATION BURDENS ON THE DEFENDANT 
The consumer welfare effect standard is sometimes criticized for creat-
ing uncertainty for firms that do not know whether their conduct is 
permissible. In a recent article, Melamed argues that antitrust law "needs 
to temper its enthusiasm for theoretical precision with an appropriate 
accommodation for the practical limitations upon firms that must comply 
with the law."197 He suggests that the profit-sacrifice test is easier for 
firms to implement in the business planning process than is the consumer 
welfare effect standard.198 
This uncertainty is greatly exaggerated. Most cases involve either con-
duct that excludes and lacks any legitimate business justification (leading 
to unvarnished consumer harm) or conduct that only minimally impairs 
rivals and has substantial efficiency justifications (leading to no consumer 
195 Ordover and Willig analyze only conduct that causes rivals to exit. For that conduct, 
they assume that the rival remains able to produce without incurring new start-up costs. 
Ordover & Willig, Predation, supra note 36, at 13. This formulation does not make it clear 
what they would assume about RRC conduct that does not cause exit. Werden's price 
benchmark is set "absent a tendency to eliminate competition." Werden, supra note 10, 
at 433. His output assumption is not stated explicitly. See also Patterson, supra note 34. 
196 See Elhauge, supra note 34, at 272, 293. Werden, supra note 10, at 418 & nn.21-25 
(prudential safe harbors). 
197 Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 7. 
1981d. 
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harm). The truly hard cases are only a small subset. And, there will be 
hard cases for any legal standard because some firms have the corporate 
DNA or the incentive to skate close to the line, wherever the line is. 199 
At the same time, the subjectivity and unresolved issues in implementing 
the profit-sacrifice standard indicates that it is not simpler for firms to 
understand and use. 
These issues can be illustrated with the examples discussed earlier. 
Suppose that a firm is contemplating an incompatible design change. 
According to Melamed, with the profit-sacrifice test, the company can 
evaluate a simple question that occurs naturally in its business planning: 
will the design change either save it operating expenses that are less 
than the cost of the change or generate incremental revenues (Le., in 
excess of revenues in the but-for world) that exceed the cost of the 
change? If so, Melamed argues, and if the defendant had a reasonable 
contemporaneous basis for thinking so, then the design change entails 
no profit-sacrifice. In contrast, the consumer welfare effect standard 
requires the company to ask how the design change affects the welfare 
of its customers and whether the design change affects rivals' costs. 
According to Melamed, this latter set of questions is more difficult for 
the firm to answer. 
A closer examination reveals that the profit-sacrifice test is not easier 
for the firm to implement for this conduct. To carry out the profit-
sacrifice test, it is not enough to evaluate the incremental cost and 
revenue of the design change. The firm also must be able to predict the 
outcome of the design change in a hypothetical, butjor world in which the 
design change does not affect the competitiveness of rivals. Making such 
an assumption and analyzing market outcomes under this assumption 
are not part of normal business planning. Business planning does not 
focus on hypothetical markets invented by antitrust practitioners and 
courts in which firms hypothetically lack the ability to raise prices, when 
in fact the firms do have such power in the real world. Nor does business 
planning focus on hypothetical markets in which competitors act in 
economically irrational ways by failing to reduce their output when their 
costs are increased. 
For example, consider the design change conduct discussed earlier 
in which the design change increases the value of a dominant firm's 
product by $5 per unit by improving the functionality of the product, 
but inextricably also makes competitors' products incompatible with the 
dominant firm's. Suppose that the dominant firm's marketing depart-
199 Priest & Klein, supra note 159. 
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ment predicts that, as a result of barriers to competition created by 
incompatibility of the dominant firm's new product with competitors' 
products, the profit-maximizing strategy would be to raise its price by 
$50, while selling the same quantity of the product. Suppose that the 
dominant firm makes the design change, raises price by $50, and then 
is sued for monopolization. 
On these facts, there is no reason why the dominant firm's managers 
would have been unable to make the relevant real-world price/quality 
comparison for the consumer welfare effect standard at the time of the 
design change. In addition to knowing the size of the likely real-world 
price increase, the firm only needs to know whether its quality-adjusted 
price will increase or decrease. Moreover, this also is information that 
the firm would need to know to maximize its real-world profits. This is 
not a situation where the consumer welfare effect standard places a 
higher burden on the firm. Implementing the profit-sacrifice test 
requires similar information. The firm must know the value consumers 
place on the product improvement in order to compare it to costs. That 
is, the firm needs to know its quality-adjusted variable cost.200 
In addition, the consumer welfare effect standard does not require 
the firm to know what is impossible to foresee. The consumer welfare 
effect standard only requires the firm to make a good-faith effort to 
estimate the expected impact of its conduct on consumers. If the reason-
ably foreseeable expected value of the conduct to consumers is positive 
but it turns out ex post that consumers are harmed, the defendant would 
not be liable. Perfect foresight is not required. 
The criticism of the information requirements of the consumer harm 
standard also ignores the fact that this type of competitive effect analysis 
is routinely applied in merger analysis.201 The antitrust agencies, outside 
attorneys, and economic consultants (and the courts in litigated cases) 
evaluate the likely competitive outcomes of mergers arising from both 
unilateral and coordinated effect theories, taking into account the poten-
tial for merger-specific cost savings, product improvements, and increases 
in innovation efficiency, as well as the constraining impact of likely 
200 For some other implementations of the profit-sacrifice test, the firm also might need 
to know the profit-maximizing price and quantity increase in the hypothetical, but-for 
world in which compatibility with competitors' products hypothetically were maintained, 
so that the competitors remained viable. That price increase mayor may not be equal to 
the $5 value of the product improvement; it would depend on additional details about 
the demand curve. That is, the counterfactual, but-for world would need to be conceptual-
ized, and the hypothetical revenue changes would need to be developed. Then, the 
increased revenue must be compared to the increased costs of the improved product. 
201 See generally Merger Guidelines, supra note 53. 
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resposluoning, entry, and expansion by fringe firms. This evidence is 
used to gauge the likely impact of the merger on prices and quality. If 
a consumer welfare effect rule of reason analysis can be implemented for 
mergers, there is no reason why it cannot be implemented for Section 2 
exclusionary conduct cases. 
In any event, it is not clear why a modest increase in the information 
burden placed on the firm should determine the antitrust standard. 
Instead, the proper test is the one that leads to the consumer welfare 
maximizing outcome, taking those costs into account. In many other 
areas, the legal system requires firms to bear information costs to ensure 
that their conduct is consistent with the social interest. For example, 
merging firms are required to bear the costs of the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
(HSR) pre-merger review process to ensure that anticompetitive mergers 
are not consummated. In product liability law, escaping liability for 
design defects requires the manufacturer to know consumer expectations 
and to compare the benefits of the challenged design against the risk of 
danger inherent in such design.202 That information is required because it 
is needed to evaluate the impact of the product design on consumer 
welfare. The consumer welfare effect test for Section 2 would have a 
similar goal: to ensure that consumers are not harmed by exclusionary 
conduct. 
The resulting burden on firms and their legal counselors would be 
modest at best. The fraction of firms that have monopoly power or 
a significant likelihood of achieving monopoly power from allegedly 
exclusionary conduct is small. Entry is easy in most markets and easy 
entry would trump these allegations. Antitrust lawyers provide counseling 
to firms regarding thousands of mergers per year, and the required 
competitive analysis for mergers is not systematically more difficult than 
the analysis required here. 
Melamed also overlooks another important issue with respect to the 
defendant's relative burdens under the two standards. Whereas the bur-
den of production under the consumer welfare effect standard clearly 
will lie with the plaintiff, the burden with respect to profit sacrifice could 
well be allocated to the defendant.203 This is because the information 
202 See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. 573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978); see also Shanks v. Upjohn 
Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1992); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 
1983). This risk/benefit analysis could be quite complicated and would include the likely 
incidence of injuries from the use of its product, taking into account its likely sales 
and the manner in which the product is used in practice, perhaps in conjunction with 
other products. 
203 Werden argues that the burden should and would be placed on the plaintiff. Werden, 
supra note lO, at 426-27, 433 & n.97. 
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required to determine whether or not there is profi t sacrifice is con trolled 
by the defendant in that it primarily involves information regarding 
the defendant's costs and demand.204 In this regard, the Covad court 
permitted the plaintiff to withstand a motion to dismiss simply because 
the complaint included the magic word "predatory." 205 In contrast, under 
a Section 2 consumer welfare effect standard, the plaintiff could only 
shift the burden of production to the defendant if it could present 
sufficient evidence to support the allegation that the defendant's conduct 
resulted in injury to consumers and rivals. 
VI. UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL BY A VERTICALLY 
INTEGRATED MONOPOLIST 
The Court in Trinko suggested the relevance of the profit-sacrifice 
standard for unilateral refusals to deal. Applying this standard would 
require the determination of price and output benchmarks. The output 
benchmark might be controversial because there are two markets (or 
market segments) involved in the analysis. For example, in Aspen Skiing, 
by refusing to sell daily lift tickets to the plaintiff, Ski Co. likely increased 
the retail sales of its own weekly tickets. Even if one were to assume (in 
the hypothetical world according to the profit-sacrifice benchmark) that 
this conduct would not allow Ski Co. to increase the price of its weekly 
tickets, the additional weekly ticket sales at current prices might have made 
the refusal to deal profitable. Thus, if the output benchmark for the 
profit-sacrifice test does not hold the defendant's output constant at the 
pre-conduct level, but permits its output to expand at the pre-exclusion 
price, then Ski Co's exclusionary conduct might not have been found to 
fail the profit-sacrifice test. It is not clear whether the Court purposely 
chose to ignore this additional source of profits or whether the defendant 
simply overlooked the argument.206 
204 A decision-theoretic analysis implies that it would make no sense to place the burden 
on plaintiffs, who have inferior access to the relevant information. For example, in the 
quick-look standard, the defendants have the burden ofjustirying concerted conduct that 
would raise prices absent a showing of competitive benefits, such as cost savings flowing 
from the concerted conduct. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 V.S. 85, 114 (1984); see also 
Gavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34, at 69-73. Of course, the defendant's control 
over the information also might give the defendant an upper hand in the litigation by 
allowing it better to shape the presentation of this information to the court. 
205 As noted earlier, the Covad court stated, "But, Covad has alleged that Bell Atlantic's 
refusal to deal was 'predatory,' which suffices to withstand a motion to dismiss because, 
in the vernacular of antitrust law, a 'predatory' practice is one in which a firm sacrifices 
short-term profits in order to drive out of the market or otherwise discipline a competitor." 
Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
206 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 V.S. 585, 599, 607-10 
(1985). For example, suppose that the sale of the tickets to the plaintiff would have led 
a fraction of the skiers to ski for two days on the plaintiff's mountain and one day on the 
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In evaluating profit-sacrifice in Trinko, Verizon clearly wanted to count 
the profits on its increased output of retail sales flowing from its refusal 
to deal. Verizon argues in its brief that it "leases out those lines at an 
average of $19.14 per line, giving up the average of $41.98 per line 
revenue it obtains selling at full retail prices (and sacrificing the customer 
relationship that might lead to sales of more services)."207 Verizon's 
proposed methodology would count (as legitimate) the profits on the 
additional retail customers absorbed as a result of the refusal to deal,208 
It is not clear whether Verizon persuaded the Court and the DO] to 
count these profits or whether the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
the regulated price exceeded even Verizon's marginal costs.209 
If output levels are permitted to be adjusted in this way in cases of 
unilateral refusals to deal by vertically integrated firms like Verizon, it also 
would be necessary to estimate the cross-elasticity of demand between the 
defendant and rival firms. For example, Verizon's calculation above 
assumes that it would capture all of the rival's output. However, if the 
products are differentiated and market demand is not perfectly inelastic 
(i.e., if total market output is not constant), then this is assumption is 
not economically correct. A better assumption is that the integrated firm 
would capture only a fraction of the sales lost by the unintegrated rival. 
In a monopoly maintenance case involving a unilateral refusal to deal 
by a vertically integrated input market monopolist (or dominant firm), 
the profit sacrifice test also requires a court to determine an input price 
benchmark.210 This same determination is required in price squeeze 
cases, where courts must define the input price level that is unlawfully 
exclusionary.211 If the firm supplies the input to non-competitors or 
defendant's mountain, whereas the refusal to deal led those skiers to ski for three days 
on the defendant's mountain. For a similar point, see Elhauge, supra note 34, at 286-87. 
Professor Patterson suggests that the Court's language supports the view not to count this 
source of profits as legitimate. Patterson, supra note 34, at 39. However, in rendering its 
decision, the Court instead could have been relying on the fact that Ski Co. was willing 
to sell those daily tickets to tour operators, and those sales would have led to the same 
type of substitution to the competitor's mountain. 
207 Brief for Petitioner at 27 n.23, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682). 
208 In their amicus brief, Professors Baumol, Ordover, Warren-Boulton, and Willig suggest 
that the proper measure of profitability for the sacrifice test would include the profits (at 
competitive prices) on the customers shifted. Baumol et aI., supra note 151, at 15. 
209 Brief for the United States, supra note 8; see also Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra 
note 11, at 392 n.49. Melamed was one ofVerizon's attorneys. 
210 Of course, if supplying the input would be technologically infeasible, then the court 
would not reach this pricing issue. 
211 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(price is exclusionary if it is "higher than a 'fair price,'"); Town of Concord v. Boston 
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.) (criticizing the Alcoa standard). 
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previously supplied the foreclosed competitor, then this input price 
might be used. However, if the integrated finn has a legitimate input 
monopoly and has never sold the input to anyone, there would be no 
observable market input price to use. In addition, it may not be clear 
whether the cause of the refusal to deal is the defendant's attempt to 
maintain its output market monopoly or whether the cause is a simple 
bargaining failure in the negotiations over the sale of the input.212 
One might suggest that the benchmark price for the input be the 
price to which the parties would have bargained "absent any lessening 
of competition." But this phrase does not create a meaningful price 
benchmark, for every price above the input supplier's marginal cost 
necessarily lessens competition by raising the rival's costs. Charging $6 
for the input instead of $5 "lessens competition," even if the buyer could 
successfully compete with the integrated monopolist if the price were 
$50. At the other extreme, a prohibitively high input price is economically 
equivalent to an absolute refusal to deal. Although this reasoning might 
suggest a benchmark input price equal to marginal cost, a marginal cost 
benchmark would not count input profits as "legitimate." This bench-
mark, in tum, would lead to the same objections as any price regulation 
of a monopolist, including that it would interfere with the firm's incen-
tives to innovate.213 
See also Illinois Cities of Bethany v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 670 F.2d 187 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
212 This analysis also suggests an important distinction between non-negotiable refusals to 
deal and situations where the vertically integrated defendant has made a bona fide offer 
to supply the input at some price but the unintegrated firm has rejected its offer. (The term 
non-negotiable refers to a refusal to deal regardless of the price offered by the competitor.) 
Bargaining failure is a more likely cause if the parties each have made legitimate price 
offers that the other has not accepted than if the refusal to deal is non-negotiable. Non-
negotiable refusals to deal raise greater suspicions that the primary motivation for the 
refusal to deal is anticompetitive. Aspen involved a non-negotiable refusal to deal with 
respect to the daily lift tickets and the revenue split for the weekly ticket. In the latter 
situation, the defendant apparently disguised its unwillingness to negotiate by making an 
offer that the plaintiff "could not accept." Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 592. 
213 For the classic analysis of this issue, see Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet 
in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST LJ. 841 (1989). This innovation defense 
obviously must be limited. If the only concern were innovation incentives, then refusing 
to deal would be per se legal. Indeed, any constraint on the dominant firm's conduct that 
reduces its profits could, in principle, adversely impact its innovation incentives. There is 
no reason to think that this extreme position makes economic sense, particularly because 
it ignores the innovation incentives of the competitors and the welfare of consumers. 
See F.M. Scherer, Technological Innovation and Monopolization 63 (American Antitrust Inst. 
Working Paper 05-07, 2005), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/ 
431.pdf (analyzing the impact of judicial remedies on incentives for innovation, and 
concluding that "[fJrom the great cases reviewed here, it would appear that dominant 
firms have accumulated far more monopoly power than is necessary to motivate and 
sustain the most rapid and beneficial rate of technological progress."). 
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To implement the profit-sacrifice test (or the no economic sense vari-
ant), a better price benchmark would be the input price that compensates 
the integrated firm for output sales lost to the input purchaser.214 This 
protected-profits benchmark input price would be calculated as the defen-
dant's (variable) input cost plus the expected reduction in output profits 
from selling a unit of the input to the plaintiff.215 
In situations where the two firms produce and sell identical, fungible 
products, this protected-profits benchmark input price equals the 
Baumol-Willig Efficient Components Pricing Rule (ECPR) developed 
in the regulatory context.216 The ECPR price benchmark equals the 
difference between the integrated firm's output price and its incremental 
costs of producing the downsteam output (not including the cost of 
the input). 217 
When the two firms sell differentiated products, the benchmark price 
would have to be adjusted to take into account the fact that not all of 
the purchaser's sales would displace output sales of the integrated firm.21B 
214 If the vertically integrated monopolist is more efficient in the downstream market 
than the unintegrated firm, this price may not permit the purchaser to earn positive profits 
to be viable. If selling the input to the purchaser would raise the defendant's own costs, 
for example, because of the defendant's technology or because the defendant's reputation 
would suffer, then the benchmark would be appropriately adjusted upwards to take these 
additional costs into account. 
215 This reduction in profits would be the defendant's profits from selling an additional 
unit of the output (i.e., the output price less its input and output variable costs) times the 
likely output sales lost by the defendant to the plaintiff for every unit of input sold to the 
plaintiff. When the firms are selling products that are perfect substitutes, this displacement 
ratio equals unity. When the products are not perfect substitutes, this displacement ratio 
is less than unity. This profit reduction can be estimated from the type of cost and demand 
information routinely used in merger analysis. 
216 Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY 
REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979); William]. Baumol, Some Subtle Issues in 
Railroad Regulation, 10 INT'Lj. TRANSP. ECON. 341 (1983); William]. Baumol &]. Gregory 
Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE]. REG. 171 (1994) ;JanuszA. Ordover 
& Robert D. Willig, Access and Bundling in High-Tech Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION 
AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 103 (Jeffrey 
A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999). 
217 For example, suppose that the integrated firm is initially selling its output at the 
monopoly price of $100. Suppose that it is earning $50 per unit because its marginal cost 
for producing the input is $10 and its other marginal costs (not including the cost of the 
input) are $40, so that its output marginal cost equals $50 per unit (i.e., $10 + $40). If 
the entrant sells a fungible product, so that every unit of input sold to the entrant entails 
a one-unit loss in output sales by the integrated firm, then the protected-profits benchmark 
price would be $60, where this $60 figure is comprised of the $10 input cost plus the $50 
(i.e., $100 - $10 - $40) profit per unit on sales lost to the entrant. 
218 Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation, 46]. 
INDUS. ECON. 115 (1998); Mark Armstrong, Chris Doyle &John Vickers, The Access Pricing 
Problem: A Synthesis, 44]. INDUS. ECON. 131 (1996); William]. Baumol,Janusz A. Ordover 
& Robert D. Willig, Parity Pricing and Its Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in the 
HeinOnline -- 73 Antitrust L.J. 371 2005-2006
2006] FLAWED PROFIT-SACRIFICE STANDARD 371 
As a result, the protected-profits input price benchmark would be lower 
than the standard ECPR calculated above.219 This lower benchmark price 
coupled with the product differentiation often would lead to more vigor-
ous price competition in the output market, even if the purchaser has 
equal or even somewhat higher costs than the integrated firm. 
In order to avoid the Cellophane Fallacy, this benchmark price would 
not be set to permit the integrated firm to maintain its monopoly profits 
in the output market.220 Instead, it only would compensate the defendant 
for profits on those output sales directly lost to the competitor, not for 
the reduced profits on the rest of its output caused by the price reductions 
arising from the entry of the competitor. For the same reason, the ECPR 
benchmark does not permit the integrated firm to charge a higher input 
price to a more efficient competitor that sells a fungible product.221 
The consumer welfare effect standard also requires a price benchmark 
for unilateral refusals to deal in order to avoid claims that all refusals 
to deal are anticompetitive and to avoid the plaintiff gaining artificial 
bargaining power. The court might utilize the input price previously 
charged or the "protected-profits" input price benchmark for this pur-
pose. 222 This means that the analysis of unilateral refusals to deal has 
similarities in the two standards. 
Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitars, 14 YALE J. REG. 145, 154-55 (1997). These 
authors sometimes refer to a modified ECPR. To avoid possible confusion, I am not using 
that terminology. 
219 For example, in the context of Trinko, ifVerizon would refuse to provide DSL inputs 
to AT&T, some additional customers would buy retail broadband service from Verizon. 
But some others would choose to obtain cable or wireless broadband service from other 
providers or stay with their dial-up service. Extending the example in the previous note, 
suppose that only half of the entrant's sales come at the expense of the integrated firm 
and half come from firms producing other products. In this situation, the displacement 
ratio would equal one-half. Thus, the protected-profits benchmark input price would be 
$35, that is, the $10 input cost plus $25, where the $25 figure reflects the $50 (i.e., 
$100 - $10 - $40) per unit profits on lost output sales, discounted by one-half to take into 
account the fact that the input sales lead to the integrated firm losing half as many output 
sales to the new entrant. 
220 The ECPR has been criticized in the regulatory context for falling victim to the 
Celfgphane Fallacy by taking the output price as given at the monopoly level. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient 
Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule"? 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1995). Baumol and Willig 
appear to agree with this criticism, but argue that the ECPR should be used after the 
retail price is properly adjusted. Baumol et aI., supra note 151, at 155. 
221 Similarly, when the products are differentiated, the protected-profits benchmark price 
would not allow the integrated firm to extract the entire profit that could be earned by 
the competing firm. 
222 An alternative benchmark would be the input price that would be charged by a 
hypothetical standalone (i.e., unintegrated) supplier with the same degree of legitimate 
market power in the input market as the integrated firm. To ope rationalize this benchmark, 
suppose hypothetically that the integrated firm is assumed to be divided up into two 
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However, evidence of profi t sacrifice would not be sufficien t for liabili ty 
under the consumer welfare standard. It also would be necessary to 
explain how the refusal to deal would harm consumers; that is, it would 
be necessary to show that sales to the competitor at the benchmark price 
would lead to consumer benefits. This is not inevitable, particularly when 
the integrated firm lacks market power in the output market.223 
Under certain other limited circumstances, a failure to show profit 
sacrifice at the protected-profits input price benchmark might not be 
fatal to the plaintiffs case under the consumer welfare standard. For 
example, if the defendant's monopoly power in the input market was 
not achieved legitimately, then no cognizable interest would be protected 
by permitting the expansion (or maintenance) of monopoly power in 
the downstream market through a refusal to supply the input. In this 
case, there may be no need to support the level of investment incentives 
provided by the protected-profits benchmark. 
Similarly, consider the situation where the integrated firm has a natural 
monopoly in the input and the firm is characterized as controlling an 
"essential facility." If the market is not regulated by a specialized regula-
tory agency, a court may take on that regulatory burden under the 
essential facilities doctrine.224 In this case, however, the court also would 
independent, unintegrated finns-a standalone input supplier and a standalone output 
producer. (For example, this would be the type of structure following a hypothetical 
"vertical divestiture" implemented against AT&T in the 1980s by the DOl under AAG 
William Baxter.) This "standalone" input price benchmark would be the profit-maximizing 
price that the standalone input supplier would charge the entrant. When the entrant is 
selling a fungible product and has the same costs as the integrated finn, this benchmark 
price equals the ECPR. When the products are differentiated, the benchmark changes 
and does not equal the protected-profits benchmark. Moreover, calculating this benchmark 
in practice would be significantly more difficult than the protected-profits benchmark, 
making it less practical for courts. 
223 For example, suppose that the only fertilizer dealer in an isolated fanning area is 
also a fanner and refuses to sell fertilizer to the competing fanners in the area. Suppose 
that the cost to these competing fanners of shipping in fertilizer from elsewhere is signifi-
cantly more expensive and would lead these competitors to exit. That refusal to deal may 
involve a sacrifice of profits by the integrated fanner and the conduct might not make 
"economic sense" in the way that the tenn is used in the no economic sense standard. 
But, if the relevant output market is national, then this refusal to deal likely would not 
have any discemable impact on prices or anticompetitive effect on consumers. As a result 
of this lack of market power in the output market, a court would not find the defendant 
liable in this case under the consumer welfare effect standard. (In contrast, an inference 
of consumer hann might make more sense if the integrated finn has monopoly power in 
both markets.) 
224 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). In 
this regard, the Trinko Court said that its opinion did not "repudiate" the "'essential 
facilities' doctrine crafted by some lower courts." Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 399 (2004). It suggested, however, that 
the doctrine would be relevant only when access to the facility is not regulated. fd. 
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have to determine the price benchmark that properly balances the short-
term benefits of price and entry competition in the output market along 
with the appropriate investment incentives for the integrated firm and 
its competitors.225 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the end, the benefits of the profit-sacrifice standard are overstated, 
and the flaws are understated. It is said to be simpler to implement 
than the consumer welfare effect standard, which is claimed to be very 
complex. Yet, the profit-sacrifice standard is highly complex. For some 
exclusionary conduct, there is no temporal profit sacrifice, so profit 
sacrifice must be gauged conceptually with the use of a benchmark price 
that must be constructed. Sometimes this benchmark price is the current 
price, but sometimes it is not. Similarly, the output benchmark for the 
profit-sacrifice standard mayor may not hold the defendant's output 
constant, and whichever output benchmark is chosen will cause errone-
ous outcomes in certain cases. 
For example, for monopoly maintenance cases, the profit-sacrifice test 
would require the court to predict the price that would occur absent 
the exclusionary conduct. But, if this price can be predicted confidently, 
then the court would be able to use the consumer welfare effect test. If 
the exclusionary conduct leads to a higher price or prevents the market 
price from falling, then there is presumption of consumer harm. It would 
make more sense for the court to evaluate whether the defendant's 
product has improved sufficiently, as a result of the exclusionary conduct, 
to outweigh the price increase. 
The consumer harm standard is said to condemn beneficial competi-
tive conduct, such as a cost-reducing investment that happens to cause 
rivals to exit from the market (and ultimately leads to higher prices). 
In fact, if the harmful effect on consumers is not reasonably foreseeable 
in probabilistic terms at the time of the investment, there would be no 
violation of the consumer effect standard. Only investments that are 
harmful on the basis of an ex ante effect analysis would be condemned. 
Nor would false positive errors be avoided by the profit-sacrifice standard. 
Some cost-reducing investments that benefit consumers clearly would 
be condemned under the profit-sacrifice standard. 
225 In this analysis, the court could recognize the potential for adverse innovation effects 
on the defendant, but might reason that a more interventionist antitrust policy would 
increase total innovation by driving increased innovation by the new entrants. See Baker, 
Promoting Innovation, supra note 24, at 514. In addition, if the entrant would be producing 
a differentiated product, a refusal to deal could cause additional consumer harm. 
HeinOnline -- 73 Antitrust L.J. 374 2005-2006
374 ANTITRUST LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 73 
Although critics claim that the consumer harm standard is too complex 
and errs in practice, the same basic standard is used routinely and 
successfully in HSR merger reviews, Section 7 cases, and Section 1 rule 
of reason cases. Making it the standard for Section 2 would unify antitrust 
law and make the doctrine more coherent. The profit-sacrifice test may 
be a useful piece of evidence in conjunction with other evidence, but 
when it is the sole liability standard, or a required prong of the liability 
standard, the profit-sacrifice test is likely to cause significant judicial 
errors without adding any benefits. In that broader role, it does more 
harm than good, relative to the consumer welfare effect standard. 
